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Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and
Doctrinal Incoherence
by
MARY L. HEEN*
Introduction
The Supreme Court has turned increasingly to a "plain meaning"
approach in statutory interpretation cases.' This approach poses spe-
cial dangers for tax law because of the rich range of contextual and
policy considerations that inform the Internal Revenue Code.2 Under
the plain meaning approach, the Court relies on the meaning of the
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1. See Wni.LAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 227
(1994) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION]; William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Tern: Foreword Law as Equilib-
rium, 108 HARV. L. Rev. 26, 58 nn.133-34 (1994) (noting that of the 56 decisions involving
statutory interpretation in the 1993 term, the Court applied plain meaning as its primary
source of interpretation in 24 cases; of the 36 cases involving statutes enacted in the last
thirty years, the Court applied plain meaning in 20 cases).
2. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9806 [hereinafter
Code]. See Deborah A. Geier, Commentary, Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REv.
445, 459-60 (1993) [hereinafter Geier, Textualism] (asserting that textualism may produce
wrong results in cases implicating the structural framework and integrity of the income
tax). See also Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA.
TAx Rxv. 492,497-502 (1995) [hereinafter Geier, Purpose] (arguing that the overall struc-
ture of the Code must inform statutory interpretation, and, consequently, Code provisions
should not be construed to damage the Code structure even if the interpretation is nonlit-
eral); Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L. Rnv. 819, 822-23 (1991) (arguing that the plain
meaning rule and legislative intent must be considered in light of the tax legislative pro-
cess); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue
Code, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 623, 630 (1986) (arguing that nonliteral interpretations of the Code
are appropriate when literal interpretation conflicts with Code policy or structure). But see
Edward A. Zelinsky, Tex4 Purpose, Capacity, and Albertson's: A Response to Professor
Geier, 2 FLA. TAx REv. 717 (1996) (critiquing the structural/social policy dichotomy sug-
gested by Professor Geier). See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEo. L.
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statutory words themselves rather than on legislative history, intent or
purpose.3 This method of interpretation, closely associated with tex-
tualists such as Justice Antonin Scalia,4 is consistent with the view that
the role of the judiciary is to interpret the text of the statute, enacted
by Congress and signed into law by the President,5 and not to inter-
pret the statute more generally in light of its legal or social context.6
J. 71, 137-40 (1996) (discussing a political-interpretive approach to tax policy analysis and
comparing three modes of interpretation as illustrations of such an approach).
3. The Court sometimes consults legislative history to "confirm or rebut" the "plain
meaning" of the statute. ESK RMGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note
1, at 227. At least in some cases, court holdings that have been labeled plain meaning
decisions by some commentators may represent instances in which the language of the
statute and the statutory purpose coincide. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M.
Shaw, The Costs of lncoherenc" A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia Hosps., Inc.
v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv. 687,700-01 (1992).
But see Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to
Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 717-22 (1992) [hereinafter Schauer, Practice
and Problems] (discussing the impact of cases where plain meaning and statutory purpose
diverge).
4. Under the textualist approach, the interpreter generally considers the statutory
text, the structure of the statute and related statutory provisions, dictionary meanings, and
certain linguistic canons of construction. For discussion and criticism of the textualist ap-
proach to statutory interpretation, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. Ruv. 621 (1990) (examining the new textualism of the 1980s); William D.
Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76
MINN. L. REv. 1133 (1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia's text- and rule-based approach to
decision making). See also, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CA. L. REv. 845 (1992) (defending the use of legislative history
in statutory interpretation); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative
History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39
AM. U. L. Rnv. 277 (1990) (discussing how the use of legislative history implicates the
roles of legislators and judges).
5. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3 (requiring bicameralism and presentment). See
generally U.S. CONST. art. I-rn (implying separation of powers). E.g., Chisom v. Roemer,
501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We are to read the words of [the] text as
any ordinary member of Congress would have read them... and apply the meaning so
determined."); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (articulating a plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation). See gener-
ally, ESKRmGE, DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 230-38 (critiqu-
ing the main constitutional justifications for the "new textualism," including the
bicameralism and presentment and separation of powers arguments, and arguing that the
textualist methodology "is no more objective or constraining than other methodologies").
6. Cf., e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MlicH. L.
REv. 20, 21-22 (1988) (arguing for a "nautical" approach to statutory interpretation, in
which statutes are interpreted in light of current conditions, and distinguishing such a dy-
namic approach to interpretation from an "archaeological" approach, where a statute's
meaning is fixed at the time of enactment); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1479 (1987) (arguing for a dynamic approach in
which statutes are interpreted in light of their current social, political and legal context);
GuiDo CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 82,163-66 (1982) (argu-
ing for judicial power to nullify or modify obsolete statutes).
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Although the textualists do not command a majority on the
Court, the Court as a whole utilizes a plain meaning approach when
the language of the statute is "unambiguous." 7 In identifying such un-
ambiguous or determinate language, the Court often refers to diction-
ary meanings of words,8 linguistic canons of construction,9 the way the
specific provision being construed relates to the statute as a whole,10
or to other legislative enactments."
Commentators have speculated about the reasons for the trend
toward increased use of the relatively acontextual plain meaning anal-
ysis. Professor Frederick Schauer suggests that the Court may use
plain meaning as a "second best coordinating device," given a "lack of
individual engagement in the outcome or nuances" of certain rela-
7. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
8. See e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991) (relying on the dic-
tionary definition of "mixture" in interpreting a federal criminal statute); Note, Looking It
Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HAv. L. REv. 1437, 1438 (1994) (finding
that dictionary definitions were used in 28% of the published opinions during the Supreme
Court's 1992 Term, a fourteen-fold increase over the 1981 Term).
9. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (applying the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon,
which can be translated as the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the other);
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 376 (1987) (plurality opinion) (observing that unlike the
Internal Revenue Code and the food stamp statute, the AFDC statute contained no exclu-
sion from income for personal injury awards, and thus welfare benefits were properly re-
duced to reflect the amount of a personal injury recovery). For a catalog of the Rehnquist
Court's canons of statutory construction, see EsKnIDGE, DYNAwc STATUTORY INTmRPRE-
TATON, supra note 1, at 323-28. See also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3
VAND. L. Rnv. 395, 396 (1950) (listing mutually conflicting canons of statutory interpreta-
tion); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REv.
1179, 1190-91 (suggesting that maxims of interpretation possess features of considerable
generality and are useful); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 921, 925-26 (1992) (arguing that the use of canons fosters social
stability); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv.
405, 413 (1989) (arguing that some disputes over meaning are in fact disputes over back-
ground norms such as constitutional principles and contemporary institutional arrange-
ments); See generally Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation,
45 VAmn. L. Rev. 529-795 (1992).
10. See eg., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515 (1993) (observing the "cardinal
rule" that statutes are to be read as a whole); Mass. v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)
(noting that the Court is guided by looking at provisions of the statute as a whole); United
Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) ("[a]
provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme").
11. See eg., West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,88-92 (1991) (con-
struing a statute providing for attorney's fees in civil rights cases by referring to other
statutes); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,564-65 (1988) (interpreting a statute by refer-
ring to two other legislative enactments).
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tively uninteresting cases and the "desire to reach some agreement for
the sake of agreement."' 2 Others point to the influence of Justice
Scalia's textualist views on other members of the Court1 3 or, alterna-
tively, to a pragmatic effort by opinion writers for Justice Scalia's
vote.' 4 Many others believe that the Court frequently exaggerates the
clarity of a statute,' 5 in order to use the plain meaning doctrine to
impose its own views, all the while paying lip service to separation of
powers.1 6
Whatever the reasons for the Court's increased reliance on the
plain meaning approach, its use depends upon a judicial determina-
tion that the statutory provision being interpreted is not ambiguous.
Whether the language of a statute is ambiguous or not may depend
upon the background and knowledge of the interpreter' 7 as well as the
12. See Schauer, Practice and Problems, supra note 3, at 722-23. See also Frederick
Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, in 1990
THE SUPREME COURT REviEw 231,250-56 (Gerhard Casper et al., eds., 1991) [hereinafter
Schauer, Coordinating Function] (arguing that the Court uses the plain meaning in statu-
tory interpretation cases as a second-best solution, to "agree about what the language they
all share requires").
13. See ESKmDGE, DYNAMc STATUTORY INERPRFTATION, supra note 1, at 226-29.
14. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Fed-
eral Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 833 (1991) ("One should not discount, how-
ever, the way in which the dynamics of majority-making may push litigants, lower courts,
and other Justices in the direction staked out by Justices Scalia and Kennedy.").
15. E.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism The "New" New Legal Pro-
cess, 12 C.swozo L. REv. 1597, 1623-27 (1991) (showing specific instances where Justice
Scalia's textualism masked the policy choices which are "inevitable in difficult statutory
interpretation cases").
16. See e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
749, 779-81 (1995) (hypothesizing that post-Chevron textualism masks political conserva-
tism and ideology); Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant" Textualism As Power
Struggle, 67 S. CAt. L. Rlv. 585, 593-97 (1994) (arguing that textualism creates interbranch
conflict); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward
a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. Rnv. 1295, 1323-35 (1990) (sug-
gesting that the textualist is attempting to correct shortcomings in the legislative process
through judicial activism). See also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory In-
terpretation, 78 GEo. L.J. 353, 411 (1989) (observing that the problem is not so much a
"lack of candor in statutory interpretation, but a lack of self-awareness in judging" and
questioning the desirability of increased judicial candor).
17. See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMuc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 58-68
(discussing Gadamer's Truth and Method); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation, 90 CoLUM. L. RIv. 609, 617 (1990) ("Interpretation is the common ground
of interaction between text and interpreter.... ."). For some of the substantial literature on
legal hermeneutics, see A Symposium on Legal and Political Hermeneutics, 16 CARDozo
L. Rnv. 1879 (1995); Interpretation Symposium" Hermeneutics and Legal Interpretation, 58
S. CAL. L. Rv. 199 (1985); Francis J. Mootz, I, The Ontological Basis of Legal Herme-
neutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and
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skill of the drafter.18 It may also depend upon the sources consulted
to aid in interpretation.
Statutes develop over a period of time and in response to the
active interrelationship among decisions of the administrative agen-
cies, the courts, and Congress.19 As Professor Edward Rubin and
others point out, some statutes are directed to bureaucracies or agen-
cies charged with enforcing complex regulatory provisions.20 Some
are enacted in response to court decisions or with the legislative ex-
pectation that courts will fill in statutory gaps when unanticipated
questions arise. 21 A specialized interpretive community may rely on
meanings for words or phrases that develop over time in a particular
regulatory context.22
Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. R-v. 523 (1988); Gary C. Leedes, The Latest and Best Word on Legal
Hermeneutics: A Review Essay of Interpreting Law and Literature. A Hermeneutic Reader,
65 NoTRE DAMEs L. REv. 375 (1990) (book review). See also Peter C. Schanck, Under-
standing Postmodern Thought and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAT. L.
REv. 2505 (1992) (detailing the philosophical premises of postmodernism and arguing that
these ideas have a profound influence on statutory interpretation).
18. See Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 730-33 (acknowledging that "there is plenty of ambi-
guity in the Code, stemming... from political compromise, poor draftsmanship, deliberate
and implicit delegation to the courts and tax administrators, and the inherent limitations of
language").
19. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 56-76; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEo. LJ. 523, 559-64 (1992).
20. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 369,380 (1989) (explaining that modem legislation "consists of directives to imple-
mentation mechanisms"); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative
State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 551-52 (1985) (distinguishing statutes addressed to govern-
ment agencies from those addressed to private persons and arguing that courts should de-
fer to agency interpretations when the agency has the authority to set policy). See also
Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12
CAmnozo L. R-v. 1663, 1673-76 (1991) (suggesting that Justice Scalia's textualism and the
Chevron doctrine reflect the divergent interpretive approaches applied by courts and poli-
cymaking agencies); Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Com-
ments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 427,442-44 (1989) (accepting Rubin's description of
the problems posed by legislation and suggesting new systemic theories for solving separa-
tion of powers problems).
21. See William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S.
CAL. L. Rnv. 541, 590-626 (1988). See also Myron C. Grauer, A Case for Congressional
Facilitation of a Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation in the Tax Area: Lessons to
be Learned from the Corn Products and Arkansas Best Cases and the Historical Develop-
ment of the Statutory Definition of "Capital Asset(s)," 84 Ky. LJ. 1, 4-7 (1995-96) (sug-
gesting methods of drafting that Congress could use in order to facilitate collaboration with
the courts).
22. See Samuel B. Sterrett, Use of Industry Definitions in Interpretation of the Internal
Revenue Cod Towards a More Systematic Approach, 16 VA. TAx REv. 1, 29-35 (1996)
(arguing that the Court should use the readily known or "industry definition" of technical
terms having a specific meaning outside of the context of the Code). For a discussion of
Apri 1997]
An acontextual determination by the Court of the threshold
question of whether a statute is ambiguous presents the possibility
that a complex statute may be misinterpreted by the Court.P3 Therein
lies the inherent limitation of the plain meaning approach. That limi-
tation has been acknowledged even by defenders of the plain meaning
approach: "Plain meaning, quite simply, is a blunt, frequently crude,
and certainly narrowing device, cutting off access to many features of
some particular conversational or communicative or interpretive con-
text that would otherwise be available to the interpreter or conversa-
tional participant. '24
The plain meaning approach also creates a heightened risk of er-
ror because of its relationship to agency deference under Chevron,
USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.Z5 Under the
Chevron doctrine, reviewing courts must defer to an agency's reason-
able interpretation of an ambiguous statute. However, under the
Court's expanding use of plain meaning analysis, the Court less fre-
quently finds statutory language to be ambiguous. In the tax context,
the plain meaning approach not only cuts the Court off from the
Code's interpretive context and policy background but also makes
deference to Treasury's expertise less likely.26
This Article examines the Supreme Court's interpretive approach
in recent tax cases. Part I of the Article sets the stage by describing
the Court's interpretive approach, its focus on the relative determi-
nacy of statutory language, and the backdrop of Chevron. Part II ex-
amines the effect of these issues on tax law, focusing on three cases
that construe the same Code provision, section 104(a)(2),2 7 but apply
the nature of technical language, see Mary Jane Morrison, Excursions into the Nature of
Legal Language, 37 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 271 (1989).
23. See Gwen T. Handelman, Zen and the Art of Statutory Construction: A Tax Law-
yer's Account of Enlightenment, 40 DEPAuL L. REv. 611, 622-32 (1991).
24. Schauer, Coordinating Function, supra note 12, at 252.
25. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
26. See Geier, Textualism, supra note 2, at 460 (suggesting that textualism takes away
the authority of the courts and the reasury Department to interpret the Code in ways that
protect its structural integrity). See infra discussion at Part I.B.
27. In all three cases, see infra Part II, the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of
§ 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. During the period relevant to the three cases,
that section provided in pertinent part as follows:
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions
allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxa-
ble year, gross income does not include-
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quite different interpretive approaches. In United States v. Burke,28
the Court appeared to find the provision ambiguous and relied in part
upon an interpretation of the statute contained in a Treasury regula-
tion.29 Subsequently, in Commissioner v. Schleier,30 the Court applied
a plain meaning analysis to find an additional "independent" statutory
requirement.3 1 Most recently, in O'Gilvie v. United States,32 the Court
acknowledged the existence of a linguistic ambiguity in the same lan-
guage interpreted by the Court in Schleier and construed it by refer-
ence to a contextual examination of the history and tax-related
purpose of the provision.3 3 The inconsistency of the analysis in these
cases is evidence that the Court's evolving approach to statutory inter-
pretation is doctrinally unstable. Moreover, a close reading of the
cases reveals unresolved doctrinal conflicts regarding the scope and
meaning of the Code provision. Although those conflicts have now
been largely resolved by Congress in legislation enacted last sum-
mer,34 the cases illustrate the doctrinal incoherence that can result
from or be intensified by the Court's inconsistent approaches to its
interpretive task.
Part Ill outlines some of the normative questions that must be
addressed if the Court continues on its present course, including an
evaluation of the costs of relying on legislative "correction." When
the Court discerns plain meaning, it analyzes the statute without con-
sideration of extrinsic contextual sources of interpretation and with-
out deference to the administrative agency charged with its
enforcement. Professor Schauer argues that this approach is a norma-
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or
sickness; ....
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 § 104(a), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (West Supp.
1989). In two of the cases, the Court decided whether the exclusion from gross income for
amounts received on account of personal injuries encompasses certain employment dis-
crimination recoveries. Each time, the Court acknowledged that employment discrimina-
tion could constitute a "personal injury" within the meaning of the statute but held that the
particular sex- and age-based discrimination recoveries received by the taxpayers were not
excludable from gross income. In the third case, the Court held that the exclusion "on
account of" personal injuries did not encompass punitive damage awards for physical inju-
ries. For a complete discussion of the cases, see infra Part II.
28. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
29. See id. at 234.
30. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
31. See id. at 2164-67.
32. 117 S. CL 452 (1996).
33. See id. at 457-58.
34. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110
Stat. 1755 (1996). For further discussion, see infra, Part I.
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tively beneficial and efficient decision-making model for a Court with
such diverse political and jurisprudential outlooks35 and that it also
protects the public from captured administrative agencies.3 6 The
question remains whether the costs of incoherence in a complex statu-
tory scheme outweigh these supposed benefits.
Although it may be too early to tell what the costs will be for the
development of tax law, the preliminary evidence suggests that the
"benefit" of less engagement by the Court in the substantive issues
may not be worth the risk of increased doctrinal incoherence. The
Court may reach sounder decisions more often with a deeper engage-
ment in the details of the statute and through a wider ranging consid-
eration of its historical, structural, and policy context. Alternatively,
consideration by the Court of these contextual sources of interpreta-
tion may more frequently result in a finding of statutory ambiguity or
indeterminacy, leading to deference to the expertise of Treasury.
I. The Court's Interpretive Approach: Plain Meaning and the
Backdrop of Chevron
The Supreme Court claims that it applies the plain meaning ap-
proach when it finds the language of the statute to be unambiguous.3 7
Determining whether language is ambiguous or not itself involves in-
terpretation. Justice Scalia often emphasizes that "plain meaning" in-
volves finding the "ordinary" meaning of words in their textual
context.38 Determinacy is a matter of degree, and because even "ordi-
35. Schauer, Coordinating Function, supra note 12, at 253-56.
36. Professor Schauer explains the concern about regulatory capture as follows:
Surely we can understand the plausibility of Rubin's worry about outsider courts
using techniques such as reading the statutes as outsiders to interfere excessively
with the ongoing and arguably family-like relationship between agency and legis-
lature. But so too might we understand the plausibility of courts worrying that
sometimes-captured agencies with a practical last word on many issues might
overassess or overclaim their own place in the governmental family. If and when
this concern is plausible, courts viewing themselves as delegated agents of the
legislature might see their role as one of enforcing the language of a statute
against the efforts of an agency to bend that language to its own will.
Schauer, Practice and Problems, supra note 3, at 736 (footnotes omitted).
37. See eg., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) ("In a
statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and
when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in
all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished."); Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498
U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (unanimous decision) ("When we find the terms of a statute unambig-
uous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances.").
38. I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of
language in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its tex-
tual context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
nary" usage may result in two or more plausible linguistic interpreta-
tions of a text, members of the Court sometimes disagree on whether
or not the language is plain.39
Plainness may be influenced by the sources consulted and the
identity of the presumed interpretive community.40 The presumed in-
terpretive community may be ordinary citizens, bureaucrats, non-
specialist lawyers or judges, or specialists. It is not unusual in tax law,
for example, for words to develop specialized meanings that differ
from their ordinary usage.41 In addition, the reason or reasons for
applying the plain meaning approach may affect an individual Justice's
relative willingness to find determinacy in the face of conflicting evi-
dence of a contrary purpose or unintended results.42 The Court's
there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordi-
nary one applies. If not-and especially if a good reason for the ordinary mean-
ing appears plain-we apply that ordinary meaning.
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the distinction between "unambiguous meaning" and "ordinary
meaning" understandings of "plain meaning," see Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain
Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.. 1561, 1563-66 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M.
SOLAN, Tim LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993)). See also George H. Taylor, Structural Textu-
alism, 75 B.U. L. REv. 321, 325-27 (1995) (distinguishing the "best case" for textualism
from standard notions of "plain meaning").
39. For a discussion of cases in which the Court has split over the "plain meaning" of
statutory language, see LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 101-04 (1993)
(applying a linguistic analysis and arguing that the Court has become increasingly and mis-
takenly dogmatic about the lack of ambiguity in statutes). Solan identifies several sources
of potential ambiguity in statutes, including (i) structural ambiguity caused by the relation-
ship of words in a sentence structure, (ii) multiple interpretations of particular words, id. at
64, and (iii) problems of categorization, id. at 94-99, which "result from the imperfect
match between concepts conveyed by the words in a statute and the virtually infinite vari-
ety of events that can occur in the world." Id at 105-06.
40. See STANLEY FisH, Is TinRE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? Tim AUTHORr= OF INTER-
PRETnv ComnmNrrms 305-21 (1980) (suggesting that meaning is the current determina-
tion of the relevant interpretive community based on each individual's life experience).
41. For example, in tax law, ordinary words such as "realization" and "basis" have
specialized meanings used in determining the tax consequences of dealings in property.
See Code §§ 1012 (defining basis by reference to "cost" of the property), 1016 (providing
for adjustments to basis), 1001(b) (defining amount realized from sale or disposition of
property). See also Code §§ 1221 (defining capital assets), 1231 (defining § 1231 gains and
losses for property used in a trade or business and for certain involuntary conversions).
For a discussion of tax rule indeterminacy and the use of highly specific language, see
John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in
the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REv. 1, 40-43 (1993).
42. For example, if Justice Scalia, a textualist, applies plain meaning due to the consti-
tutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment, he would be inclined not to de-
part from the plain meaning of the text to take into account contrary evidence of meaning
in legislative history. See supra notes 3-6. By contrast, although Justice Stevens has relied
on plain meaning in interpreting statutes, he is willing to consider contrary evidence of
meaning in the legislative history because he finds helpful the traditional tools of statutory
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struggle with its interpretive task thus has often focused on what
sources of meaning will be consulted by the Court.
In the background of any discussion of plain meaning in statutory
interpretation cases involving administrative agencies lurks the Chev-
ron doctrine and more than a decade of controversy43 and inconsistent
applications.44 The following section briefly describes the Chevron
doctrine and then discusses its application by the Court in tax cases.
A. The Chevron Doctrine
In Chevron, the Court adopted a two-step approach for judicial
review of administrative agency interpretation of statutes. 45 In the
first step, the reviewing court determines whether Congress has ex-
pressed a clear intention regarding the "precise question at issue."'46
If so, the "court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of Congress." 47 If the statute is silent or
ambiguous, the court proceeds to the next step. Under the second
step, the court defers to the agency's interpretation of the statute un-
less it finds the agency's interpretation to be unreasonable.4s
construction as a means of ascertaining legislative intent. See infra notes 54-60 and accom-
panying text. See generally, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. RFv.
953, 985 (1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Problems with Rules] (discussing the moral and polit-
ical dimension of views about what the law means and observing that "when prevailing
views change, judgments of meaning, even of relatively plain meaning, may shift as well").
43. E.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 CoIUM. L. REv. 452, 456 (1989) (arguing that the Chevron doc-
trine requires a recasting of separation of powers and legitimacy principles); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2074-85 (1990)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Law and Administration] (describing Chevron as "counter-Marbury"
by requiring courts to play a more adaptive role in the administrative state, and observing
that the principle of deference to agency interpretations of statutes has "produced consid-
erable controversy"). But see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Prece-
dent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Judicial Deference] (challenging
the view that Chevron functions as a "counter-Marbury" because the Court has not strictly
applied its all-or-nothing approach).
44. See Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 43, at 981-83 (finding in an empirical
study that the Supreme Court applied Chevron in about one-third of the cases during the
1984-1990 terms, and one-half of the cases during the 1987-1990 terms, in which the Court
reviewed agency interpretations of statutes); Pierce, supra note 16, at 750 (stating that
"post-Chevron jurisprudence is so confused that it is difficult to determine what remains of
the original, highly deferential test"). See also Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKn LJ. 984,
1029-36 (reporting empirical data concerning the effect of Chevron on lower court review
of agency decisions).
45. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
46. Id. at 842.
47. Id. at 842-43.
48. Id. at 843-44.
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The Chevron doctrine can be viewed as a "new default presump-
tion that Congress implicitly assigns agencies authority to resolve am-
biguities in the statutes the agencies administer." 49 The Court
explained in Chevron that its deference to administrative agencies is
consistent with our constitutional system, which vests policy-making
discretion in more expert, representative, and politically accountable
executive agencies.50 The President and executive branch have power
to resolve statutory ambiguities or gaps in accordance with the admin-
istration's agenda.5 1
The Court has not reached a stable consensus concerning how
reviewing courts determine whether a statute is silent or ambiguous.
In tracing the evolution of the Supreme Court's step one analysis, Pro-
fessor Merrill has found that although the Court has been somewhat
inconsistent, it has shifted from a focus on whether Congress ex-
pressed a "specific intention," to whether the statute is "'ambiguous'
or 'unclear,"' and finally to whether the statute has a "plain meaning,"
with no reference to "the precise question at issue."52 Merrill argues
that "there are signs that Chevron is being transformed by the Court
into a new judicial mandate 'to say what the law is.' '5 3
Along with the shift in formulation, the Justices disagree about
step one methodology. Justice Stevens, for example, usually relies
upon "traditional tools of statutory construction," including legislative
49. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Inter-
pretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612,625 (1996). See also Sunstein, Law and
Administration, supra note 43, at 2119 (concluding that the "Chevron principle does not
apply unless Congress has given law-interpreting power to the agency"). But see Dan M.
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. Rnv. 469, 490-92 &
n.125 (1996) (arguing for the Chevronizing of federal criminal law even though Congress
hasn't delegated to the Justice Department the authority to engage in interpretive lawmak-
ing with respect to general criminal statutes).
50. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. For an extensive discussion of this rationale, see Jane
S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 108 HARV. L. Rlv. 593 (1995).
51. See e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183-87 (1991) (noting that an agency's
construction of an ambiguous statute is not to be disturbed if it does not conflict with
congressional intent, and that a prior agency interpretation may be reversed by the agency
due to "changing circumstances").
52. Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 43, at 990-91. For a recent example of the
Court's articulation of the "plain meaning" formulation, see Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB,
116 S. Ct. 1396, 1401 (1996) ("If a statute's meaning is plain, the Board and reviewing
courts 'must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."') (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
53. Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 43, at 970 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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history, to determine statutory meaning.5 4 Justice Scalia, on the other
hand,55 argues that the use of traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion at step one would eviscerate Chevron, making deference "a doc-
trine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would
otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue."'56
As a textualist, Justice Scalia objects to the examination of legis-
lative history to determine Congressional intent.5 7 As a practical mat-
ter, however, Justice Scalia's textualist approach may result in less
frequent deference to agency interpretation of statutes.58 Although
54. See, eg., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443-46 (1987) (overturning the
Attorney General's interpretation of a provision of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act). See also William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The
Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 DuKE LJ. 1087, 1136-60. Professor Popkin observes that,
in tax cases, Justice Stevens has tended to adhere closely to statutory language because of
the importance of consistent administration and "taxpayer reliance on fixed rules." Id. at
1158. Where the language of the Code is not clear, however, Justice Stevens "appears
ready to adopt an interpretation that prevents tax avoidance." Id. at 1158 n.368. The opin-
ion by Justice Stevens in Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995), is generally
consistent with those observations. See infra Part II.
55. See generally Popkin, supra note 4, at 1133-36 (comparing Justice Stevens' intent-
based case-by-case approach to statutory interpretation with Justice Scalia's text and rule-
based approach).
56. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. E.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the plurality for "resort[ing] to that last hope of lost
interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction, legislative his-
tory"); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criticizing the majority for devoting four-fifths of its substantive analysis to the evolution
and legislative history of a Federal Rule of Evidence); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87,
97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (refusing to join that part
of the majority opinion that analyzed lower court opinions referred to in the legislative
history); Hirschey v. Federal Emergency Reg. Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 6-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (voicing concern that routine deference to the details of committee
reports and the predictable expansion of such detail "are converting a system of judicial
construction into a system of committee-staff prescription"); ANToNiN ScALA, A MATrER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS ANm Tm LAw 29-30 (1997) (stating that "legisla-
tive history should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute's meaning").
58. Justice Scalia explains this result as follows:
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from
its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the
triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that
Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I
would not personally adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a "plain meaning"
rule, and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached
by legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity ....
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 521.
But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the CourtCongressi
President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613, 679-80 & n.301 (1991) (citing Justice
Scalia's explanation and arguing that textualists have engaged in false modesty about the
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Justice Scalia's views have gained some ground on the Court,5 9 the
role of legislative history and the use of other traditional tools of stat-
utory construction in the Chevron framework remain unclear.60
Other important issues concerning the application of Chevron in-
clude the type and format of administrative interpretations to which
courts should apply Chevron,61 and the meaning and scope of the
subordinate role of the Court in statutory policy-making); Geier, Textualism, supra note 2,
at 457 (questioning the "accepted wisdom" that Justice Scalia is a supporter of Chevron
deference); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WAsH. U. L.Q. 351,372 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill, Textualism] (arguing that the textualist
approach is "incompatible with an attitude of deference toward other institutions-
whether the other institution is Congress or an administrative agency"). Contra Gregory
E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28
CoNN. L. Rnv. 393 (1996) (arguing that textualism and the Chevron doctrine are not in
conflict).
59. E.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,291 (1988) (in ascertaining plain
meaning, "the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the
language and design of the statute as a whole") (citations omitted).
60. See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 117 S. Ct. 913, 920 n.14
(1997) (Stevens, J.) (restating the principle stated by the Court in Smiley v. Citibank, 116
S.Ct. 1730, 1733 (1996), that "Chevron deference arises out of background presumptions of
Congressional intent"). Compare City of Chicago v. Environmental Def. Fund, 114 S. Ct.
1588, 1594 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (concluding that the statute's text required rejection of the
agency's interpretation, which went beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity the statute
contained); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992)
(Kennedy, J.) (using dictionary definitions to find ambiguity and deferring to the agency's
interpretation); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 89 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (applying the Chev-
ron framework and deferring to an agency interpretation of the statute) with Holly Farms
v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1396, 1401 n.6 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.) (referring to the legislative history
and purpose of the statute and concluding that the Board's interpretation of an ambiguous
provision was "reasonable"); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) (Stevens, J.) (examining legislative history and statutory pur-
pose to find Department of Interior regulation "reasonable"). See Merrill, Textualism,
supra note 58, at 355-56 (noting the decrease, but not the elimination of, the use of legisla-
tive history). See also Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 43, at 984-85, 988-89 (docu-
menting Chevron's inconsistent application and suggesting that Chevron may be a mere
canon of construction); Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 43, at 2105-19 (argu-
ing that deference is one among many interpretive principles or norms used in statutory
construction).
61. E.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manu-
als, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J.
1311 (1992) (noting the different types of agency interpretive formats and their appropriate
use); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REQ. 1, 4 (1990) (discussing "whether Congress intended to delegate
to the agency the power to interpret with the force of law in the particular format that was
used"); Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 43, at 2093-2104 (discussing defer-
ence to legislative rules, agency law-decaring as opposed to law-applying, issues of agency
jurisdiction, agency bias, and departures from past practices). See also Reno v. Koray, 115
S. Ct. 2021, 2026-27 (1995) (citing Chevron and stating that an internal agency guideline of
the Bureau of Prisons was entitled to "some deference" since it constituted a "permissible
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"reasonableness" standard in step two of the Chevron framework.62
When the Supreme Court resolves statutory interpretation cases at
step one, questions involving application of the "reasonableness" stan-
dard are frequently not addressed.63 A plain meaning analysis at step
one generally results in less acceptance by the Court of agency views
than under the pre-Chevron approachr a However, when the Supreme
Court does apply the two-step Chevron framework, it more often than
not has deferred to the agency's interpretation. 65
B. The Court's Application of Chevron in Tax Cases
Although Chevron has been cited by the Supreme Court in a few
tax cases,66 Chevron has not had the same influence in the tax world
construction of the statute" (citations omitted)); Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115
S. Ct. 1232, 1240 (1995) (deferring to an agency interpretation of its own regulation).
62. E.g., Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot Separating Interpretation and Law-
making Under Chevron, 6 ADMN. L. J. AM. U. 187, 210-12 (1992) (arguing that judicial
review under step two should apply to agency interpretations made pursuant to an express
delegation of interpretive authority); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasiz-
ing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 Tux. L.
REv. 83, 125-38 (1994) (arguing for increased emphasis on step two of Chevron and more
scrutiny of the reasonableness of agency interpretation).
63. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 58, at 362 ("The currently fashionable ap-
proach.., is for the Court to... find that the statutory meaning is unambiguous, and then
drop a footnote indicating that there is no need to consider deference to agency views.");
Pierce, supra note 16, at 750 (observing that the Court "gradually ceased to apply step two
of the Chevron test ... because it rarely acknowledges the existence of ambiguity").
64. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 58, at 362 (noting that Chevron's potential def-
erence effects are "largely an illusion" because of the increased use of step one resolu-
tions); Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 43, at 984 ("Paradoxically, it appears that
adoption of the Chevron framework has meant, if anything, a decline in deference to
agency views.").
65. Merrill, Textualism, supra note 58, at 359-60 (showing empirical data supporting
agency deference in Chevron framework cases, but also reporting the "counterintuitive"
finding that the Court is less likely to defer to agency views in cases in which the Court
applied the two-step Chevron framework than in cases in which the Court did not invoke
the Chevron framework); Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 43, at 982 (using empirical
data to show that some cases are still resolved using traditional methods of statutory
construction).
66. E.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241,246 n.4 (1985) (deferring to regulation
which correlated the statutory "reasonable cause" standard for relief from penalty for late
filing of a tax return with "ordinary business care and prudence" as consistent with Con-
gressional intent and over forty years of case law, and citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 &
n.14). See also Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1685-86
(1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that permitting depreciation for the value of a
newspaper's paid subscribers constitutes a "rejection of statutory interpretation settled by
Congress itself through reenactment of the tax code and a further invasion of the political
domain to rewrite a Treasury regulation," and citing pre-Chevron cases as well as Chev-
ron); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,242 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting an
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as it has had in other areas of law.67 For several years after Chevron,
the Supreme Courts commentators,69 and the Tax Court70 continued
to cite pre-Chevron authority in discussing whether to defer to agency
interpretation of the Code. Commentators suggest several possible
reasons for the relative infrequency of citation to Chevron in tax cases.
Some note that prior to Chevron, the Court was already employing a
heightened level of deference to administrative interpretations of tax
law.71 Thus, Chevron may have been perceived by some as requiring
no marked change in approach from prior tax case law on deference.
At least one commentator attributes the lack of Chevron's impact on
IRS construction as being outside the "range of reasonable interpretation of statutory
text").
67. See Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA.
TAX REV. 51, 54 (1996) (noting that Chevron has been mentioned in tax cases only after
1989 and by the Tax Court only since 1992). See generally Sunstein, Law and Administra-
tion, supra note 43, at 2075 ("In an extraordinarily wide range of areas-including the
environment, welfare benefits, labor relations, civil rights, energy, food and drugs, banking,
and many others-Chevron has altered the distribution of national powers among courts,
Congress, and administrative agencies.") (footnotes omitted).
68. See, e.g., Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 560-62 (1991) (citing
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979), but not citing
Chevron).
69. See e.g., Livingston, supra note 2, at 829 n.39 (discussing deference to tax regula-
tions without citing Chevron); Zelenak, supra note 2, at 673-74 (discussing deference to tax
regulations without citing Chevron, but instead citing National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v.
United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979)). See also Samuel B. Sterrett, Suggested Approach for
Judicial Interpretation of Regulations That Grant Discretion to Taxpayers, 12 VA. TAX RFv.
477, 494 (1993) (discussing interpretations of regulations without citing Chevron, but in-
stead citing Cottage Say. Ass'n, 499 U.S. 554, a post-Chevron case that cites pre-Chevron
authority, including National Muffler, in upholding a Treasury regulation).
70. The Tax Court of the United States was established by Congress in 1969 as an
Article I court, although its predecessor was an independent agency in the executive
branch. See Code § 7441; Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730. In one of the first articles
discussing Chevron's application to administrative interpretations of tax law, Professor
Galler noted that Chevron was first cited by the Tax Court in two 1992 decisions, after the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit "gently criticized the Tax Court for its lack of atten-
tion to Chevron." Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue
Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REv. 841, 844 n.16 (1992) (citing Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 948 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991)).
71. Aprill, supra note 67, at 57-61 (discussing the "serious" deference standard ap-
plied to interpretive tax regulations during the pre-Chevron period); Merrill, Judicial Def-
erence, supra note 43, at 983 n.56 (observing that "even in years when Chevron is applied
with some frequency [by the Court,] it tends to be invoked less often in areas where there
is a particularly rich tradition of pre-Chevron precedent on deference," and giving the ex-
ample of tax cases where "the Court... still tends to frame the deference standard in the
terms expressed in earlier decisions").
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tax law, at least in part, to the insularity of the tax bar.2 Just as plau-
sible, however, are the unique characteristics of tax law,73 which ar-
guably entail specialized approaches to interpretation.74
The relationship between pre-Chevron and post-Chevron defer-
ence and the effect of Chevron on judicial review of administrative
interpretations of the tax code raise issues that deserve systematic
analysis.75 My task here is the more limited one of attempting to
parse what the Supreme Court seems to have done in several recent
tax cases, and to explore some of the implications for interpretation of
72. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, Or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 554-563 (1994) (arguing that the tax bar has neglected
Chevron's administrative law principles and their proper application).
73. See Livingston, supra note 2, at 826-38 (pointing to factors such as the complex
and constantly changing nature of the tax code, the contextual style of tax interpretation
that emphasizes Treasury regulations, previous judicial determinations and the broader
statutory structure rather than the literal meaning of the statute being construed, and the
conceptual nature of the tax legislative process, in which House Ways and Means and Sen-
ate Finance Committee members do not see the actual statutory language until after the
committee report is issued). See also Bradford L. Ferguson et al., Reexamining the Nature
and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of the Process, 67
TAxFs 804 (1989).
74. See John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in
the Chevron Era, 64 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 35, 51-73 (1995) (relying on the distinction be-
tween legislative and interpretive regulations in the tax context, Congress's provision of
independent review of tax determinations, and the pattern of interaction between Con-
gress and the Treasury); Livingston, supra note 2, at 872-86. See also Geier, Textualism,
supra note 2, at 462-72 (discussing Chevron, and arguing that textualism can lead to incor-
rect results in tax cases that implicate the structural issues of tax base definition, that is, the
notion of what constitutes "income" under an income tax); Zelenak, supra note 2, at 636-
37 (arguing that nonliteral interpretations of tax law that take into account the structures
and policies of the Code are permissible even under "meaning-based," as well as "intent-
based" approaches to interpretation).
75. See Aprill, supra note 67, at 53 n.10, 55-81 (reporting on results of a study of
approximately four hundred lower court tax cases, examining "the extent to which Chev-
ron has influenced judicial review of tax regulations"); Coverdale, supra note 74, at 53, 60
& n.116 (reporting that in the decade since Chevron, appellate and trial courts considered
challenges to legislative regulations in at least fifty cases and only fourteen of those cases
cited Chevron; and of the more than one hundred fifty cases challenging interpretive regu-
lations, only eighteen of the cases mentioned Chevron); see also Beverly I. Moran &
Daniel M. Schneider, The Elephant and the Four Blind Men: The Burger Court and Its
Federal Tax Decisions, 39 How. LJ. 841, 907-27 (1996) (surveying Burger Court tax opin-
ions that defer to Treasury regulations). The inconsistent application of Chevron by the
Supreme Court and the corresponding secondary effects on lower courts pose potential
empirical and conceptual obstacles to such a comprehensive review of tax cases. For a
discussion of some of the difficulties, and their effect on the conclusions reached from the
data gathered in a general survey of Supreme Court cases before and after Chevron, see
Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 43, at 981-82 & n.53 (applying a broad test in decid-
ing whether the Court applied the Chevron framework, essentially asking whether the au-
thor of the controlling opinion was "thinking about" Chevron in setting forth the analysis
of deference).
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tax statutes. My focus is on the Court's interpretation of Code provi-
sions where the agency's interpretation is provided in the form of a
Treasury regulation.7 6 Although revenue rulings77 and other forms of
76. For purposes of this inquiry, I do not distinguish between legislative and interpre-
tive regulations in the tax context other than to 1) describe the characteristics of each and
2) point out that both types of Treasury regulations are issued pursuant to notice and com-
ment procedures. See generally Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of
Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAx LAw. 343, 350-61 (comparing the administrative law
distinction between legislative and interpretive regulations to the distinction applied in tax
law, and concluding that "[c]ourts in tax cases should continue to draw the interpretive-
legislative line by determining whether the Treasury derived its authority from a specific
delegation or from its general rulemaking power under section 7805(a)").
Under the tax law understanding of the distinction, legislative rules are promulgated
pursuant to specific statutory authority. E.g., Code §§ 337(d) (providing that the Secretary
"shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary and appropriate" to carry out Gen-
eral Utilities repeal, including specific areas of coordination and potential circumvention);
1502 (providing the Secretary with authority to issue consolidated return regulations for
affiliated corporations); 7872(c)(1)(E) (providing for application of below market loan
rules "[t]o the extent provided in regulations ... if the interest arrangements of such loan
have a significant effect on any Federal tax liability of the lender or the borrower"). Inter-
pretive tax regulations are promulgated pursuant to the more general authority of Code
§ 7805(a), which provides that "the Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regula-
tions for the enforcement of this title .... ." See Rowan Cos. Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S.
247, 253 (1981) (discussing the distinction between regulations issued pursuant to general
versus specific authority).
Although the Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to follow notice and
comment procedures when promulgating legislative rules, but not interpretive rules, 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d), Treasury customarily follows such procedures with respect to both leg-
islative and interpretive regulations. See MICHAEL I. SALTzMAN, IRS PRAcncn AND PRo-
cmDuPu 3.02[3] (2d ed. 1991); Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)(2), (d)(1) (1996) (requiring notice
and comment procedures to be followed as required by the APA and "in such other in-
stances as may be desirable" and providing for the publication of regulations in the Federal
Register and Code of Federal Regulations).
The Supreme Court cited Chevron in upholding the reasonableness of an interpretive
regulation promulgated under the authority of Code § 7805(a) in United States v. Boyle,
469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 85-93. The relevance of
the distinction to whether a regulation is entitled to Chevron deference has been a matter
of some debate. For extensive discussion of the differences between "specific" and "gen-
eral" authority regulations in the tax context and the argument that Chevron should not
apply to tax regulations promulgated under Code § 7805(a), see Coverdale, supra note 74.
The regulation discussed in Part II would be categorized as "interpretive" or a "general
authority" regulation in the tax context.
77. See 'Reas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a), (iii) (1996) (defining revenue ruling as an
"official interpretation by the Service" that has been issued by the National Office and
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin to "promote correct and uniform application of
the tax laws" by the IRS and "to assist taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary
compliance").
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interpretative guidance raise related issues,78 they also raise format
issues79 requiring separate analysis.80
In general, as discussed below, the Court's deep divisions about
the use of legislative history and other tools of statutory construction
at step one of the Chevron analysis have not had as much impact on
tax law because of the Court's general pattern of proceeding quite
quickly to a "reasonableness" analysis in tax cases.8' When step two is
reached, there appears to be little difference in the level of deference
given by the Court to Treasury regulations during the pre-Chevron
and post-Chevron period. 2 However, step one of the Chevron frame-
work, if applied in a literalist or textualist way, holds potential dangers
78. See generally Manning, supra note 49 (distinguishing Chevron deference from "the
older but closely related principle that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations
must receive similar deference" and arguing that the Supreme Court should reject the pre-
sumption that the delegation of rulemaking power to an agency gives the agency the right
to construe its own rules authoritatively).
79. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
80. See Coverdale, supra note 74, at 84-87 (arguing that revenue rulings are entitled to
considerably less weight than interpretive regulations); Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to
Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56 Omo ST. L. J. 1037, 1040 (1995)
(describing emerging and conflicting standards regarding the weight given revenue rulings
and arguing that "revenue rulings should be treated consistently in all judicial fora"); Gal-
ler, supra note 70 (discussing Chevron and criticizing Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472
(1990), in which the Court did not cite Chevron but gave "considerable weight" to a reve-
nue ruling providing a contemporaneous and longstanding interpretation of § 170 of the
Code, and arguing that courts should not apply Chevron deference to revenue rulings); see
also Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of Increased
Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 637 (1996) (critiquing Galler's
analysis); Linda Galler, Letter to the Editor, 72 TAX NOTES 769 (Aug. 5, 1996) (replying to
Caron's critique).
81. E.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234 (1992); Cottage Savings Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985). See also,
eg., Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 224-27 (1984) (discussing National Muffler and
refusing to defer to an "unreasonable" interpretation by the Commissioner of a percentage
depletion allowance provision); Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 316-17 (1983) (citing
National Muffler and deferring to the Commissioner's "reasonable" interpretation of Code
§§ 752(c), (d) & § 1001(b), which required the taxpayers to include the full amount of an
outstanding nonrecourse obligation in the amount realized on the sale of property); Rowan
Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253, 262-63 (1981) (holding regulations interpreting the
definition of "wages" for employment tax purposes to be unreasonable under the stan-
dards of National Muffler); see generally James P. Holden & Matthew J. Zinn, Foreward to
Supreme Court Decisions in Taxation: 1983 Term, 38 TAX LAW. 421, 433-34, Tables 1 and 2
(1985) (listing the Supreme Court's tax deference cases and the voting patterns of the Jus-
tices on deference to Treasury regulations).
82. See Aprill, supra note 67, at 67 (observing that National Muffler places more em-
phasis on step two of the "reasonableness" inquiry and that the National Muffler standard
has been applied in tax cases both before and after Chevron); Coverdale, supra note 74, at
37-38 (arguing that pre-Chevron deference standards have been applied by the Court in
the tax context).
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for tax law because of the importance of construing the Code coher-
ently in light of the overall structure, context, and purpose of tax
law.83
The following discussion describes two post-Chevron Supreme
Court tax decisions that defer to administrative interpretations of tax
law. One case cites Chevron, and the other does not, although in both
cases the Court applied a two-step type analysis.84 These cases are
discussed in some detail to show how the Court approached its inter-
pretive task.
The year after Chevron was decided, the Court cited Chevron in
United States v. Boyle.85 In Boyle, the Court deferred to a regulation
interpreting Code section 6651(a)(1), 86 and held that a taxpayer's reli-
ance on an attorney to prepare and file an estate tax return did not
constitute "reasonable cause" so as to defeat a statutory penalty in-
curred because of late filing.87 The Court first noted that the term
"reasonable cause" is not defined in the Code.88 The relevant Treas-
83. E.g., Livingston, supra note 2; Zelenak, supra note 2. Applied in a textualist form,
step one of the Chevron analysis would preclude consideration of the legislative history
and purpose of the specific tax provision being interpreted, its prior interpretation, and
how the provision relates to the policy and structure of the tax code as a whole. See Geier,
Textualism, supra note 2.
84. The extent to which the analysis used by the Court resembles Chevron is subject
to debate. Professor Coverdale states in a recent article that the Supreme Court has never
applied Chevron deference to interpretive tax regulations. Coverdale, supra note 74, at 59
(acknowledging that the "failure to grant Chevron deference to general authority regula-
tions in the handful of cases in which it might have done so could indicate that the Court
considers Chevron inapplicable to general authority regulations" or it may "reflect nothing
more than the confused state of its deference jurisprudence."); but see David A. Brennen,
Treasury Regulations and Judicial Deference in the Post-Chevron Era, 13 GA. ST. L. Rnv.
387, 417 (1997) (concluding that although the Court has not cited Chevron with any fre-
quency in tax cases, Chevron deference is "alive and well with respect to Treasury regula-
tions"). My reading of the cases suggests that the Court's discussion is consistent with a
Chevron-type two step framework, with a more searching emphasis on the reasonableness
inquiry at step two. I differ with Professor Coverdale with regard to what the Court seems
to be doing at step one, in which the Court quickly notes the silence or ambiguity of the
statute with regard to the question at issue, but agree that the Court's "step two" analysis
lists factors more closely identified with a less deferential standard or a more searching
reasonableness inquiry than was applied in Chevron. Our disagreement may thus simply
center on the extent to which the Court's analysis in tax cases resembled a two-step ap-
proach rather than whether the Court has applied Chevron in the tax area in the same
highly deferential way it has been applied in other contexts.
85. 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985).
86. Id. To escape the late filing penalty, the taxpayer had to prove under § 6651(a)(1)
that the failure did not result from "willful neglect," and that the failure was due to "rea-
sonable cause." Id. at 245.
87. Ld. at 252.
88. Id. at 246.
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ury Regulation requires the taxpayer to show that, despite "ordinary
business care and prudence," the taxpayer is "unable to file the return
within the prescribed time."89 The taxpayer argued unsuccessfully
that the statute applies a standard of willfulness only, and that the
regulation is incompatible with the statute because it converts the stat-
ute into a test of "ordinary business care."90 After examining various
amendments to the statutory provision and noting the lack of any leg-
islative history discussing the change in language,91 the Court con-
cluded that Congress intended to require the "absence of fault":
A taxpayer seeking a refund must therefore prove that his failure to
file on time was the result neither of carelessness, reckless indiffer-
ence, nor intentional failure. Thus, the Service's correlation of "rea-
sonable cause" with "ordinary business care and prudence" is
consistent with Congress' intent, and over 40 years of case law as
well. That interpretation merits deference. See, e.g., Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844, and n.14 (1984).92
The Court thus deferred to the regulation's interpretation of
"reasonable cause" and applied a "bright line" approach, holding that
reliance by the executor on an attorney (as the executor's agent) to
file the return did not relieve the executor (as principal) of the duty to
fie a timely return.93
The Court relied on pre-Chevron authority six years after Boyle
in Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner.94 Without citing Chevron,
89: Id. (citing 26 C.F.R. § 301.6651(c)(1)(1984)).
90. Id. at 246 n.4.
91. d. at 245 n.3.
92. Id. at 246 n.4. The specific page from Chevron cited by the Court in Boyle in-
cludes the following discussion of implicit delegation:
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is im-
plicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own con-
struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency .... We have long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administra-
tive interpretations "has been consistently followed by this Court whenever deci-
sion as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting
policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the mat-
ters subjected to agency regulations."
467 U.S. at 844 (footnotes and citations omitted).
The Court's cite to Chevron is thus somewhat ambiguous. The Court may be either (i)
applying Chevron deference to Treasury's interpretive regulation or (ii) citing Chevron for
its discussion of pre-Chevron deference.
93. Boyl4 469 U.S. at 251-52.
94. 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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the Court applied a Chevron-type framework, but cited pre-Chevron
case law in applying the deference standard. Cottage Savings involved
the simultaneous sale and repurchase by a savings and loan associa-
tion of participation interests in different pools of home mortgage
loans secured by single-family houses.95 Under then existing Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) accounting rules,96 the mortgages
were treated as having been exchanged for "substantially identical"
ones held by other lenders.97 As a result, the transactions were not
reported as losses for FHLBB purposes.93 When Cottage Savings
claimed a $2.44 million tax loss on the sale of the mortgages, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction. 99
The Service claimed that no loss had been "realized" on the "sale
or other disposition of property" under section 1001(a) of the Code.1 °
According to the Service, no "disposition" had occurred because the
properties exchanged were not "materially different," as required
under the applicable Treasury regulation.101 The savings association
claimed that any exchange of property constituted a "disposition of
property" under section 1001(a), regardless of whether the property
exchanged was "materially different."'1 2 Alternatively, the associa-
tion argued that the participation interests were "materially different"
because the underlying loans were secured by different properties. 10 3
The Court first noted that "[n]either the language nor the history
of the Code indicates whether and to what extent the property ex-
changed must differ" to be a "disposition" under section 1001(a).104
The Court then deferred to the "material difference" interpretation of
the Treasury regulation, citing a pre-Chevron case for the deference
standard:
Because Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the power to
promulgate "all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of [the Internal Revenue Code]," 26 U.S.C. § 7805, we must defer to
his regulatory interpretations of the Code so long as they are rea-
95. It at 557-58.
96. The Court noted that the FHLBB rules had been relaxed to facilitate transactions
that would generate tax losses without affecting the economic position of the savings and
loan associations. Id. at 557.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 558.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 559.
101. Id. at 559-60 (discussing Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1).
102. Id. at 560.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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sonable, see National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States,
440 U.S. 472, 476-77.105
After examining the history of the longstanding regulation, which
had remained unchanged through various Code reenactments, and its
consistency with the Court's landmark cases on realization, the Court
found the regulation's interpretation of section 1001(a) to be
"reasonable."' 6
The Court in Cottage Savings thus appeared to rely on the pre-
Chevron deference standard at step two of its analysis, when it deter-
mined that the agency's interpretation of section 1001(a) was "reason-
able." Although the Court found the "material difference" standard
to be a "reasonable" interpretation of the statute, it refused to apply
the standard in the way suggested by the Service and held that the tax
loss was realized when properties with "legally distinct entitlements"
were exchanged. 107
In National Muffler, 0 the pre-Chevron case cited by the Court in
Cottage Savings, the Court had first noted the statutory term at issue,
"business league,"' 09 was "so general" that an interpretive regulation
was appropriate.1 0 The Court explained that in such a situation it
customarily defers to the regulations "found to 'implement the con-
gressional mandate in some reasonable manner.""' The Court noted
that deference to the Treasury regulation was appropriate because
Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury and his delegate,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the task of prescribing rules
and regulations for the enforcement of the Code." 2 That delegation
105. Id. at 560-61.
106. Id at 561-66.
107. Id. at 566. The Court declined to defer to the Service's application of the regula-
tion to the facts of the case because the Service had not issued "an authoritative, prelitiga-
tion interpretation" of what property exchanges satisfy the "material difference"
requirement. Id. at 562-63. The Court instead examined the case law and structure of the
Code provision from which the test derived and concluded that the properties were "mate-
rially different" because the exchanged interests embodied "legally distinct entitlements."
Id. at 566. The Court concluded that the loss was therefore "realized" under § 1001(a)
when the properties were exchanged. Id.
108. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
109. The Court in National Muffler held that a trade association that confined its mem-
bership to Midas muffler dealers and their concerns was not entitled to tax exempt status
as a "business league" within the meaning of Code § 501(c)(6). Id. at 488-89.
110. Id. at 476.
111. Id. at 476-77 (citing United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546,550 (1973) (quoting
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967))).
112. Id. at 477 (citing Code § 7805(a)).
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helps ensure consistency in application and best utilizes agency
expertise.11 3
The Court then articulated the following test in its review of
agency interpretation:
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the con-
gressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the
regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its ori-
gin, and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it is a
substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those
presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the regula-
tion dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits
inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time the
regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consis-
tency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the degree of scru-
tiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-
enactments of the statute.114
The Court observed that the Commissioner's interpretation of
the Code provision at issue, while not the only possible one, "bear[s] a
fair relationship to the language of the statute, it reflects the views of
those who sought its enactment, and it matches the purpose they ar-
ticulated."11 5 In addition, the regulation evolved over fifty years to
"reflect congressional design" and had been "infrequently but consist-
ently" interpreted by the agency.116
Both pre-Chevron and post-Chevron authority suggest that if the
Code provision being construed is silent or ambiguous, the Court will
defer to a "reasonable" interpretation of the statute by the agency.
As noted above, a Treasury regulation will be found "reasonable"
under National Muffler if it "harmonizes with the plain meaning of the
statute, its origin, and its purpose."117 Before reaching the "reasona-
bleness" step of the analysis under Chevron, however, the Court con-
siders whether the deference standard is triggered under step one.118
The relationship between the Chevron framework and the gloss
on "reasonableness" provided by National Muffler is problematic. If
the Court takes a textualist approach to the question of the statute's
meaning at step one, it may not reach the step two "reasonableness"
inquiry. If step two is reached, it is unclear how the Court would ap-
113. Id.
114. Id. (footnotes omitted).
115. Id at 484.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 477.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 52-60.
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ply National Muffler, which requires that the regulation harmonize
with the statute's origin, purpose, and "plain meaning."
Professor Ellen Aprill has suggested that the National Muffler ap-
proach to judicial review of tax regulations provides a model for revis-
ing the application of the Chevron doctrine in contexts beyond tax.119
Under the revised formulation, which Aprill calls the "muffled" Chev-
ron approach, the Court would begin by examining the plain meaning
of the statute, looking to its language and structure but not its legisla-
tive history. However, unlike the textualist's application of the Chev-
ron step one, the first step of the reformulated Chevron approach,
according to Aprill, would not presume that the statute's meaning is
plain. Under Aprill's approach, plain meaning would be "the excep-
tion rather than the rule.' 120 In step two, the reviewing court judges
the reasonableness of administrative interpretation against the origin
and purpose of the statute, particularly as shown in the legislative
history.
Although Professor Aprill's proposal for "muffling" Chevron of-
fers a practical way of blunting the effects of Chevron on lower court
review of agency action once step two is reached,121 it does not suggest
a basis for countering what Professor Aprill identifies as Supreme
Court "practice" of presuming that the meaning of a statute is plain.
Without such a basis, it is unclear why the Court should depart from
current practice or why a reformulated textual analysis would result in
a finding of plain meaning less often than now occurs.122
119. Aprill, supra note 67, at 55, 81-90.
120. Id. at 82. It is unclear from Professor Aprill's discussion, which focused more on
step two of the analysis, how this standard would apply in practice. She cites an article
discussing the Tax Court's evolving approach to plain meaning for "factors that the Tax
Court has required before finding that language is plain." Id. at 82 n.185 (citing Ilyse
Barkan, New Challenges to Use of the Plain Meaning Rule to Construe the IRC and Regs, 69
TAX NoTEs 1403 (Dec. 11, 1995)). The factors discussed in the cited Barkan article (the
absurdity, consistency, futility, and omissions tests), however, do not appear to represent a
significant departure from the textualist methodology.
121. Professor Aprill's "muffled Chevron" proposal is drawn in part from the Tax
Court's application of Chevron and National Muffler.
[T]ax opinions often transform the National Muffler tripartite test of harmony
with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose into a two-step
test. The first step looks at the statutory language. The second step considers
purpose and origin through the use of legislative history. These two steps differ
in important ways from both the original Chevron two-step and the two-step as
reformulated by Justice Scalia. This "muffled Chevron doctrine"-a combination
of National Muffler and Chevron-offers a model for statutory interpretation and
regulatory review applicable beyond tax.
See April, supra note 67, at 81-82.
122. Id. at 88-90.
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Professor John Coverdale, on the other hand, proposes collapsing
steps one and two into a pre-Chevron type analysis in which there
would be no need for a default presumption of administrative inter-
pretative primacy in cases of statutory gaps or ambiguities.'2 Unlike
Aprill's proposal, his approach completely rejects the application of
the Chevron two-step analysis in the tax context, but allows courts to
take the agency views into account even as the judges retain their pre-
Chevron authority to be the ultimate arbiters of a statute's meaning
and scope.
As discussed below, the relative respite that tax law has enjoyed
from the plain meaning approach may be in the process of ending.
The Supreme Court may in the future more frequently resolve tax
cases at step one by applying a plain meaning analysis. If that devel-
opment occurs, the results may turn on whether or not the statute can
be found to have a "plain meaning" rather than on whether Treasury's
interpretation of the Code is reasonable.
H. A Case Study: Inconsistency About Ambiguity and the
Resulting Doctrinal Incoherence of Burke, Schleier,
and O'Gilvie
Three times in the last five years, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the scope of section 104(a)(2) of the Code. In two cases, the
Court decided whether the exclusion from gross income for amounts
received "on account of personal injuries"'1  encompasses certain em-
123. See Coverdale, supra note 74, at 89. Under this approach, a National Muffler
analysis would apply in challenges to interpretive tax regulations, with the courts acting as
primary interpreters of the Code and giving significant weight to the agency's views. Id. at
67. Thus, rather than applying a two-step analysis, in which courts must accept any mini-
mally reasonable agency view when Congress has not spoken directly to the issue, courts
would instead weigh the agency's views along with its own interpretation of the statute. Id.
at 89. For legislative tax regulations, courts would accept any reasonable position of the
agency (as Chevron would require at step two) but "they should take the agency's views
into account in their initial reading of the statute, rather than ignoring the agency until
after they have determined whether Congress has spoken to the issue addressed in the
regulation." Id. This proposal generally calls for adoption of a position articulated by
commentators prior to Chevron, in which the standard of judicial review of agency inter-
pretation would reflect the substantive content of the agency action being reviewed. ld. at
35 (citing Ernest Gellhom & Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75
COLUM. L. Rav. 771, 783 (1975)).
124. For the text of the statute applied by the Court in these cases, see supra note 27.
As discussed in Part Ill, Congress amended § 104(a)(2) last summer so that the exclusion
from gross income is now limited to any damages (other than punitive damages) received
on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness. See infra note 232.
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ployment discrimination recoveries. In United States v. Burke'2 and
in Commissioner v. Schleier,126 the Court acknowledged that under
certain circumstances employment discrimination could constitute a
"personal injury" within the meaning of the statute, but held that the
particular sex and age-based discrimination recoveries received by the
taxpayers were not excludable from gross income. In December 1996,
in O'Gilvie v. United States,127 the Court held that punitive damages
received for physical personal injuries were not excludable from gross
income.
Although the three decisions each rejected the taxpayers' claims,
the Court applied quite different interpretive approaches. Unlike the
general pattern of deference in the tax cases discussed in the previous
part, Schleier provides an example of a tax case in which the Court did
not rely upon the "reasonableness" of Treasury's interpretation of the
statute, but instead relied primarily upon the Code's "plain mean-
ing. 1 28 In contrast, three years before Schleier, the Court in Burke
appeared to view the same Code provision as ambiguous and to ac-
cept at the outset of its analysis the Treasury regulation, which identi-
fies personal injuries as those based upon tort or tort-type rights.' 29 In
O'Gilvie, the Court applied the rationale of Schleier to a physical in-
jury case, but at the same time acknowledged the linguistic ambiguity
of the "plain" language interpreted by the Court in Schleier.'30
The different approaches taken by the Court in these three cases
provoke at least two questions. First, did the Court's different inter-
125. 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992) (holding that settlement of Title VII back pay claims for
sex-based wage discrimination are not amounts received "on account of personal injuries"
excludable under Code § 104(a)(2)).
126. 115 S. Ct. 2159, 2164-65 (1995) (holding that back pay and liquidated damages
under ADEA are not amounts received "on account of personal injuries" under Code
§ 104(a)(2)).
127. 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996) (holding that punitive damages award of $10 million received
in a tort suit by the husband and two children of a woman who died of toxic shock syn-
drome was not excludable from gross income under Code § 104(a)(2) because it was not
received "on account" of personal injuries).
128. See 115 S. Ct. at 2164-65. See also United States v. Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. 849, 851-
52 (1997) (Breyer, J.) (holding in a unanimous decision that the statutory limitations pe-
riod provided by 26 U.S.C. § 6511 for tax refund claims does not authorize equitable toll-
ing); Commissioner v. Lundy, 116 S. Ct. 647 (1996) (O'Connor, J.) (applying a "plain
meaning" interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 6512(b)(3)(B), which provides a "look back" pe-
riod for obtaining a refund of overpaid taxes in the U.S. Tax Court). Justice O'Connor was
joined in the majority in Lundy by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Stevens dissented, and also joined the dissenting
opinion of Justice Thomas.
129. Burke, 504 U.S. at 234.
130. O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 454-55.
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pretive approaches result in different conclusions about the meaning
of section 104(a)(2), or can the cases be reconciled? Second, if the
Court did reach different conclusions about the meaning of a statutory
term in these cases, what are the implications of the Court's struggle
with its interpretive task?
As argued in this part, two of the cases give inconsistent mean-
ings to the same statutory provision excluding from "gross income"
the "amount of any damages received.., on account of personal inju-
ries or sickness.' 31 In Burke, the Court accepted without qualifica-
tion the regulation's interpretation of the scope of the statute.132 In
Schleier, the Court relied on a plain meaning analysis of the text of the
statute and found the Treasury regulation's tort-type rights standard
to be either limited in its ambit or in addition to the statutory require-
ment that the amounts be received "on account of personal inju-
ries.' 33 At bottom, the Court's two views about the scope and plain
meaning of the Code cannot be reconciled. In addition, the Court's
contradictory conclusions about the statute's ambiguity in Burke,
Schleier, and O'Gilvie signify that the Court's doctrines of statutory
interpretation are dangerously manipulable. The inconsistent ap-
proaches led the Court into a doctrinal tangle.
The discussion below first briefly summarizes the interpretive ap-
proaches and holdings in Burke and Schleier, describes the two-part
test articulated by the Court in Schleier, and then examines the two
components of the test in some detail. It ends with a discussion of
how the co-existing parts of the test create confusion about what con-
stitutes a "personal injury," and how O'Gilvie dealt with some related
interpretive issues in the quite different context of punitive damages
received for physical personal injuries.
In Burke,' 4 the Court held that amounts paid in settlement of
sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil
131. Code § 104(a)(2).
132. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 234.
133. 115 S. Ct. at 2166. In rejecting the taxpayer's reliance on the regulation, the Court
stated that "[w]e need not decide whether the Commissioner would have authority to dis-
pense entirely with the statutory requirement, because she disclaims any intent to do so,
and the text of the regulation does not belie her disclaimer." Id.
134. The Burke case was filed as a tax refund suit by three women employees of the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Burke v. United States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 'I
50,203 (E.D. Tenn. 1990), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
The women received distributions under the settlement of a Title VII action brought
against the TVA by an individual plaintiff and the Office and Professional Employees In-
ternational Union (the "Union"). 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 50,203 at 83,744-45. Under
the settlement agreement, the TVA agreed to pay $4,200 to the original individual plaintiff
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Rights Act of 1964 are not "damages... received on account of per-
sonal injuries," and thus are not excludable from gross income under
section 104(a)(2).135 Although the majority opinion 136 does not cite
or discuss Chevron, the Court appears to apply something like the
Chevron framework.137 It concludes that neither the text nor legisla-
tive history provides any explanation of the term "personal injuries,"
and then it relies on a Treasury regulation that interprets the Code
section.138 The majority opinion refers to the "tort or tort type rights"
standard of the regulations under section 104(a)(2), 139 and explains
that "IRS regulations formally have linked identification of a personal
injury for purposes of section 104(a)(2) to traditional tort princi-
ples.' 40 Although Justice Scalia's concurring opinion rejects the reg-
ulation's tort type rights standard as an unreasonable interpretation of
and a total of $5 million to the other affected employees. d. at 83,746. The TVA withheld
federal income taxes and social security taxes from amounts distributed to claimants re-
ceiving an allocated portion of the $5 million settlement award. Id. at 83,746-47. Several
of the claimants then filed for refund of the withheld taxes, asserting that the § 104(a)(2)
exclusion was applicable to a Title VII settlement award. Id. at 83,747.
The district court denied the refund claim, ruling that, because the women had sought
and obtained back pay rather than compensatory or other damages, the amounts were not
excludable as damages for personal injuries. I&L at 83,749. The Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) depended upon whether the injury and the
claim were "personal and tort-like in nature," 929 F.2d at 1121, 1124, and concluding that
Title VII provided a tort-like cause of action for injury to the dignity of the person. Id. at
1121-22. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, relying on
Title VII's remedial scheme to hold that the injury and claim were not tort-like in nature.
Burke, 504 U.S. at 237-242.
135. Burke, 504 U.S. at 242.
136. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Justices Scalia and Souter wrote concurring
opinions. Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice
Thomas.
137. The validity of the regulation itself was not at issue in Burke. Both the govern-
ment and the taxpayer relied on the regulation for the applicable "tort or tort type rights"
standard, but disagreed about its application in cases where the damages were measured by
loss of income. See infra note 143; cf Merrill, Textualism, supra note 58, at 376-77 (catego-
rizing the Burke case in the Appendix entitled "Agency Deference Cases in the Supreme
Court 1991-92 Terms" as accepting the agency interpretation, but not following the Chev-
ron framework and thus not applying a step two analysis).
138. 504 U.S. at 234.
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1996). The full text of the regulation is set forth below:
(c) Damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness. Section
104(a)(2) excludes from gross income the amount of any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness. The
term "damages received (whether by suit or agreement)" means an amount re-
ceived (other than workmen's compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit
or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement
entered into in lieu of such prosecution.
140. Id. at 234.
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the statute,141 the other eight Justices accept the regulation's interpre-
tation' 42 of the statutory exclusion's scope.143
In Schleier, 44 the Court held that back pay and liquidated dam-
ages in settlement of an age discrimination claim were not excludable
141. Justice Scalia first explains in Burke that a "commonsense" construction of the
terms "personal injuries or sickness" in § 104(a)(2) would limit application of the exclusion
to injuries to the recipients' physical or mental health, and thus, the exclusion ought not
apply to nonphysical injuries such as defamation. Id. at 243-44 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Significantly, he acknowledges that his "commonsense" reading of the statute is inconsis-
tent with the "tort rights" formulation adopted by the Treasury regulation. Id. at 245-46.
Citing the Chevron case, he rejects the regulatory standard as "not within the range of
reasonable interpretation of the statutory text." Id. at 242. He concedes that the term
"personal injuries" could be read in isolation to encompass noncontractual injuries for
which remedies would be provided in an action for damages. Id. at 242-43. Nevertheless,
because the term is part of the phrase "personal injuries and sickness," he concludes that
the words should not be interpreted beyond their "more narrow and normal meaning" as
referring to injury to the body of the person. Id. at 243. Applying the canon of statutory
construction "noscitur a sociis" and examining the use of the phrase "personal injuries and
sickness" in other subsections of § 104(a), he concludes that "personal injuries" refer only
to physical or mental health injuries. I& at 243-44 (translating the maxim "noscitur a
sociis" as meaning "a word is known by the company it keeps").
Under his statutory analysis, the settlement payments are not "on account" of per-
sonal injuries within the meaning of § 104(a)(2). Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Although he concedes that a victim of employment discrimination could suffer psychologi-
cal harm, he emphasizes that the "entitlement to back pay under Title VII does not depend
on such a showing." Id. In his view, the only redressable legal injuries under Title VII are
produced by "economic deprivation." Id. Thus, he concludes that settlement amounts in
respect of back pay do not come within the statutory exclusion. Id
142. The dissent in Burke agrees that the Court properly deferred to the tort type
rights standard of the regulations, citing a pre-Chevron case, United States v. Correll, 389
U.S. 299 (1967). Burke, 504 U.S. at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Correll case is
cited in both the post-Chevron case of Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1991), and the
pre-Chevron case, National Muffler, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
143. The Burke opinions diverge, however, when the Justices apply the regulation's
standard to the taxpayer's Title VII claims. The concurring opinion by Justice Souter ac-
knowledges good reasons in favor of placing Title VII on either side of the line dividing
contract and tort actions. Id at 247-48 (Souter, J., concurring). irning to a "default rule"
of statutory interpretation-that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed-he
concludes that he need not decide whether the action was more "tort-like" or more "con-
tract-like." Id. at 248. In his view, where application of the exclusion is not clear, the
exclusion of income should be denied. Id. The dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor
disagrees with the majority's focus on the range of remedies available as a means of deter-
mining whether the claim was "tort-like" in nature, and would more broadly apply the
"nature of the claim" analysis. Id. at 248-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas,
J.).
144. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995). The Schleier case arose from the settlement of a class
action ADEA suit brought by former United Airlines employees, including pilots and
other flight crew members, who were automatically terminated at age sixty. Id. at 2161-62.
The former employees won a jury verdict of willful violation of ADEA by United. Id. at
2162. The District Court's judgment in favor of the employees was reversed on appeal due
to erroneous jury instructions. Monroe v. United Air Lines, 736 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1984),
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from gross income under section 104(a)(2). 145 In an opinion by Justice
Stevens,146 the majority concluded that no part of the settlement is
excludable under the plain meaning of the statutory requirement that
the damages be received on account of personal injuries.147 In addi-
tion, the majority concluded that recoveries under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA)14s are not based upon "tort or
tort type rights."'1 49
The Schleier case articulates "two independent requirements"
that must be met before a recovery may be excluded from gross in-
come under section 104(a)(2).150 First, the underlying claim giving
rise to recovery must be based on "tort or tort type rights.'' s5 Second,
the damages must be received "on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness.' 5 2 The first requirement derives from the Court's opinion in
Burke and the text of the applicable regulation. 53 The second re-
quirement is set forth by the Court for the first time in Schleier, and it
cert denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985). The parties then reached a settlement under which
United agreed to pay each class action plaintiff a specific amount designated as back pay
and liquidated damages in equal proportions. 115 S. Ct. at 2162. United withheld income
taxes from back pay portion but not the liquidated damages portion of the settlement pay-
ments. Id.
Under the settlement agreement, Erich Schleier received $145,629. Id. When he filed
his 1986 federal income tax return, he included the back pay portion in income but ex-
cluded the portion attributed to liquidated damages. Id. After the Service issued a defi-
ciency notice asserting that the liquidated damages portion should have been included in
gross income, Schleier filed a Tax Court petition claiming that he had correctly excluded
the liquidated damages. Id. He also sought a refund for the tax he had paid on the back
pay portion of the settlement. Id. In an unreported opinion, the Tax Court agreed with
Schleier, concluding that the entire settlement amount was excludable from gross income
under § 104(a)(2). Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed without opinion, relying on a prior panel
decision that had applied the tort-like standard adopted in Burke and found age discrimi-
nation awards to be excludable. Id. at 2162-63. The Supreme Court granted review to
resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeal concerning "the taxability of ADEA recov-
eries in general and of the United settlement in particular." 115 S. Ct. at 2163.
145. 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
146. Justice Stevens' majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment without
authoring or joining an opinion. Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by Justice Thomas and
in part by Justice Souter. Thus, in both Burke and Schleier, only five Justices comprised the
majority, with three of the same Justices in the majority each time. See supra note 136.
147. 115 S. Ct. at 2165.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
149. 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2165-67 (referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1996)). For the text of the
regulation, see supra note 139.
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is based on the language of the statute itself.154 The inconsistencies
between the two parts of the test can best be understood by examining
in detail what the Court says about each requirement-beginning with
the approach adopted in Burke.
A. The Tort or Tort Type Rights Standard: Determining the Nature of
the Claim
In Burke, the Court applied the "tort or tort type fights" standard
of the regulations to determine whether the sex discrimination claim
asserted was in the nature of a personal injury claim.'55 The Court
examined the remedial scheme of the employment discrimination stat-
ute to determine whether the claim asserted was sufficiently tort-
like.' 56 The majority reasoned that Title VII in its then applicable
form' -5 7 did not redress tort type rights because it did not permit re-
covery for traditional harms associated with personal injury such as
pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, and other
consequential damages. 5 8 Title VII permitted only the award of back
pay, injunctions, and other equitable relief.1 59 The original Title VII
154. 1d. at 2164-65. The statutory language also is repeated in the text of the regula-
tions. See supra notes 27 & 139.
155. 504 U.S. 229, 237 (1992). Prior to Burke, the government had extensively litigated
the issue of attempted exclusions from gross income for intangible personal injuries. For a
discussion of pre-Burke cases, see, e.g., J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment
of Employment-Related Personal Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MoNT. L. REv. 13
(1989) and Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment Dis-
crimination Recoveries Under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capita4
Realization, and Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REv. 549, 583-92 (1994). The government's
position had evolved over a period of more than seventy years, from one in which only
physical injuries were encompassed by the statute to its position in Burke that the "focus of
the inquiry is whether the nature of the recovery for a claim of nonphysical injury compen-
sates for a personal loss or represents an economic gain." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at 10 n.7, United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (No. 91-42). For intangible injuries, the Service thus relied on a
distinction between recoveries for "personal" injuries as opposed to "business" or eco-
nomic injuries.
The Supreme Court in Burke adopted the "nature of the claim" test, holding that
employment discrimination could constitute a "personal injury" within the meaning of
§ 104(a)(2) "if the relevant cause of action evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and
remedy." 504 U.S. at 237, 239.
156. Id. at 237 n.7.
157. The Court in Burke applied the law in effect prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, which amended Title VIi's remedial scheme to include
compensatory and punitive damages for certain claims of intentional discrimination. 504
U.S. at 237-38 n.8.
158. Id. at 239.
159. See id. at 238.
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remedial scheme thus did not "recompense a Title VII plaintiff for any
of the other traditional harms associated with personal injury.' 60
The Court acknowledged that employment discrimination or
other injury to nonphysical personal interests constitutes a "personal
injury" for purposes of federal tax law if the relevant cause of action
"evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and remedy. ' 161 However,
the majority distinguished Title VII from other federal antidiscrimina-
tion statutes with more expansive remedial schemes. 162 The Court fo-
cused on the limited nature of the back pay remedy, stating that
"Congress declined to recompense Title VII plaintiffs for anything be-
yond the wages properly due them-wages that, if paid in the ordinary
course, would have been fully taxable."'163 Accordingly, the Court
held that Title VII does not redress a tort-like personal injury within
the meaning of section 104(a)(2) and applicable regulations. 164
The Schleier opinion subsequently clarified two aspects of the
"tort or tort type rights" standard adopted in Burke. First, the Court
emphasized that the primary characteristic of an action based on tort
type rights is the availability of compensatory remedies.165 The tax-
payer had argued that the availability of a jury trial and liquidated
damages in age discrimination actions brought such claims within the
Burke test. 66 The Court held that those features were not sufficient,
stating that the ADEA provided no compensation for many tradi-
tional harms associated with personal injury. 67 The Court concluded
that monetary recoveries were limited to back wages, which are of an
160. Id. at 239.
161. Id.
162. The Court distinguished Title VII from 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and fair housing actions
under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which both allow for jury trials and for
compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 240.
163. Id. at 241 (citation omitted).
164. Under the amendments provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, claims of inten-
tional discrimination may be tried before a jury and remedied with compensatory and pu-
nitive damages. The taxpayers in Burke argued that the expanded scope of Title VII, as
amended, provided additional support for their contention that Title VII claims are inher-
ently tort-like in nature. The Court rejected that argument, but, at the same time, sug-
gested that it might reach a different result under the amended version of the statute, and
noted that "Congress' decision to permit jury trials and compensatory and punitive dam-
ages under the amended Act signals a marked change in its conception of the injury
redressable by Title VII." Id at 241 n.12. The Court concluded, however, that the amend-
ments could not be imported back into analysis of the statute as it existed at the time of the
taxpayer's lawsuit against their employer. See id
165. 115 S. Ct. at 2166.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 2167.
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"economic character,"' 68 and that liquidated damages serve a punitive
rather than a compensatory function.169 While observing that "this is
a closer case than Burke," the Court concluded that a claim under the
ADEA "is not one that is 'based upon tort or tort type rights." 7 0
Second, the Court held that satisfaction of the "tort or tort type"
standard is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for excludability
under section 104(a)(2).17' Although the Court acknowledged in a
footnote that a post-Burke revenue ruling' 72 suggested that satisfac-
168. See id.
169. Schleier had argued that ADEA liquidated damages served to compensate victims
of discrimination for personal injuries that are difficult to quantify. See id. at 2164. The
Court agreed that if Congress had intended ADEA's liquidated damages to compensate
plaintiffs for personal injuries, those damages might come within the exclusion. See id. at
2165. The Court saw two weaknesses in Schleier's argument, however. First, even if Con-
gress were aware of an earlier decision which had described liquidated damages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act as compensating for "obscure" injuries, Congress may not have
understood that observation "as referring to injuries that were personal rather than eco-
nomic." Id. Second, the Court emphasized that it had previously concluded that ADEA
liquidated damages were a departure from those in the Fair Labor Standards Act, and were
intended by Congress to be punitive in nature. See id. (citing Trans World Airlines v. Thur-
ston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985)). Thus, the Court held that the liquidated damages de-
scribed by ADEA are not received "on account of personal injury or sickness." Ld.
The Schleier decision thus pointed toward resolution of the issue of punitive damages
because of its resolution of the liquidated damages issue. The Court viewed ADEA liqui-
dated damages to be punitive rather than compensatory, and held that they were not dam-
ages received "on account of personal injuries or sickness." Id. But cf. Robert W. Wood,
Schleier Strikes Taxpayers Three Times, 68 TAx Noms 475, 478-79 (July 24, 1995) (stating
that although "the Supreme Court has tipped its hand that punitive damages may not be
excludable in any circumstance," there "are certainly arguments that punitives in true per-
sonal injury cases (such as the hypothetical automobile accident case described by the
Supreme Court) should be excludable from income").
170. 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
171. See 1.
172. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61. The ruling applied the nature of the claim test
adopted in Burke to employment discrimination remedies available to claimants under Ti-
tle VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988), the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (prohibiting racial discrimi-
nation in "making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoy-
ment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship"). The
Service examined the range of remedies available for each theory of recovery available
under each statute. If the specific claim asserted involved "tort or tort type rights," all of
the amounts received were excluded. Under that approach, the Service held that compen-
satory damages and back pay received for Title VII disparate treatment sex discrimination
claims were excludable under § 104(a)(2). The Service explained that the same result
would apply even if the recovery in the case were limited to back pay. Back pay received
for disparate impact sex discrimination, however, would not be excludable. In addition,
the Service held that compensatory damages and back pay received in satisfaction of a
claim for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII are excludable under
§ 104(a)(2). The Service specified that the same result would be reached if the intentional
race discrimination recoveries were limited to back pay. Under the reasoning of the ruling,
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tion of the "tort type rights" standard is sufficient, the Court observed
that "the Service's interpretive rulings do not have the force and effect
of regulations" and "may not be used to overturn the plain meaning of
a statute."'173
B. Amounts Received "On Account of Personal Injuries": The Statutory
Standard
The Court's "plain meaning" reading of section 104(a)(2) pro-
vides the basis of the Court's newly articulated separate and in-
dependent requirement for excludability. Without citing Chevron or
discussing the two-step analysis, the Court began with an illustration
of "the usual meaning of 'on account of personal injuries"' by examin-
ing a "typical recovery in a personal injury case" such as an automo-
bile accident.174 If the hypothetical injured taxpayer suffered medical
expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering and emotional distress, and
settled the resulting lawsuit for $30,000, the entire amount is excluda-
ble under section 104(a)(2). According to the Court, "each element of
the settlement is recoverable not simply because the taxpayer received
a tort settlement, but rather because each element of the settlement
satisfies the requirement set forth in 104(a)(2) ... that the damages
were received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness."1 75
The Court then compared its accident hypothetical with an age
discrimination settlement. Although at "first glance" the back pay
award may appear comparable to the accident victim's recovery of
lost wages, the Court rather cryptically concluded that a back pay
award is different: "Whether one treats respondent's attaining the age
of 60 or his being laid off on account of his age as the proximate cause
of respondent's loss of income, neither the birthday nor the discharge
can fairly be described as a 'personal injury' or 'sickness.' "176
Although the Court acknowledged that an "unlawful termination may
recoveries in cases with both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims would be
partially excludable and partially taxable, raising potentially difficult allocation issues. The
ruling took no position on age discrimination recoveries or the taxation of punitive
damages.
After Schleier, the Service revoked the ruling and asked for public comment on how
its position should be revised in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Schleier. Notice
95-45, 1995-34 I.R.B. 20. In the meantime, in situations affected by Schlejer, the Service
would not issue letter rulings on whether amounts received are excludable from gross in-
come under § 104(a)(2). Rev. Proc. 96-3, §§ 1.02, 5.05, 1996-1 I.R.B. 82.
173. 115 S. Ct. at 2167 n.8 (citations omitted).
174. lId at 2163.
175. Id. at 2164.
176. Id.
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have caused some psychological or 'personal' injury comparable to the
intangible pain and suffering caused by an automobile accident," the
Court concluded "it is clear that no part of respondent's recovery of
back wages is attributable to that injury.1 77
The Court emphasized that in the hypothetical automobile acci-
dent, the accident causes a personal injury which causes a loss of
wages.178 In contrast, "[i]n age discrimination, the discrimination
causes both personal injury and loss of wages, but neither is linked to
the other."1 79 Thus, the Court concluded that the back pay is not ex-
cludable under section 104(a)(2) because an ADEA back pay recov-
ery is not received "'on account of any personal injury and because
no personal injury affected the amount of back wages recovered."' 80
The dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor'81 pointed out the
implicit contradiction between the Burke and Schleier understanding
of what is meant by damages received on account of a "personal
injury."
Justice O'Connor argued in the first part of her opinion, joined by
Justice Thomas, that the majority's analysis contradicted its funda-
mental premise that "personal injury" can encompass both tangible
and intangible harms. 18 The hypothetical contrast between ADEA
back pay and lost wages as a result of an accident has significance,
Justice O'Connor asserted, "only if one presumes that there is a rele-
vant difference for purposes of section 104(a)(2) between the car
crash and the illegal discrimination."' 83 Although physical and mental
injuries "differ from the economic and stigmatic harms that discrimi-
nation inflicts upon its victims," the difference has no relevance for
purposes of section 104(a)(2) unless the Court were distinguishing be-
tween tangible and intangible harms.184 Justice O'Connor then com-
pared ADEA injuries to the harm to reputation and loss of business
income caused by defamation. The injuries "may not always manifest
themselves in physical symptoms, but they are no less personal," and
should be excluded under section 104(a)(2).18 5
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Id
180. Id.
181. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182. See id. at 2167-68.
183. Id. at 2169.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2169-70. The defamation example chosen by Justice O'Connor was signifi-
cant because of the nature of the claim analysis adopted by Burke, which implicitly re-
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In the second part of her opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and
Souter, Justice O'Connor argued that notwithstanding that "funda-
mental defect" in the Court's analysis, ADEA damages should be ex-
cluded under the test established in Burke.186 She also took issue with
the imposition of an independent statutory requirement.187 She
pointed out that for thirty-five years the Service had interpreted its
regulation as establishing the overall ambit of section 104(a)(2), and
specifically as establishing the meaning of the term "personal inju-
ries." That was also the position taken by the Service in Burke, in a
post-Burke revenue ruling, and presented by the government to the
courts below and in their opening brief before the Court in Schleier.
According to Justice O'Connor, only the Commissioner's reply brief
contradicted that long history. 8 8 She argued that unless the Court
was willing to find the Service's longstanding prior position unreason-
able, the prior interpretations and practices of the Service could not
be ignored.189
Responding to the majority's position that agency rules may not
be used to "overturn the plain meaning of a statute," she insisted that
jected the pre-Burke litigation position taken by the Service in defamation and malicious
prosecution cases. See supra note 155.
186. Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Court in Burke deferred to the regulation,
stating that "discrimination could constitute a 'personal injury' for purposes of § 104(a)(2)
if the relevant cause of action evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and remedy." I&
at 2170 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Burke, 504 U.S. at 239). Unlike Title VII,
ADEA provides for jury trials and does not limit relief to back pay. ADEA "authorizes
courts to grant the panoply of 'such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes'
of the Act." Id. (emphasis in original). Regardless of whether liquidated damages are
classified as compensatory or punitive, the remedies available under ADEA go beyond the
circumscribed remedies permitted under Title VII. According to the dissenters, those dis-
tinctions qualified an ADEA suit as a tort-type action under Burke. See id.
187. See iii at 2171.
188. See i& See supra discussion of format issues at text and notes 61 & 79-80. Justice
Stevens quoted the government's reply brief as arguing that the regulation authorizes the
application of the exclusion "only when it both (i) was received through prosecution or
settlement of an 'action based upon tort or tort type rights'. . . and (ii) was received 'on
account of personal injuries or sickness."' I& at 2166. The government's reply brief pro-
vided the following example to illustrate that the definition in Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) of
the regulations could not be understood apart from the statutory requirement:
[A] corporation or individual may recover damages under a "tort or tort type"
cause of action-such as claims for injuries to property, fraud, and trade libel-
that would not qualify for an exclusion from income under the statute because
they involve injuries to property or other economic interests rather than injuries
to the person.
See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at n.2, Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995)
(No. 94-500).
189. See 115 S. Ct. at 2171 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the "language of the statute is anything but plain."1 ° The regulation
was promulgated to deal with the ambiguity of the concept of "per-
sonal injuries," which had resulted in controversies over the scope of
the exclusion. Rather than declare the regulation to be unreasonable,
the majority merely added a statutory requirement without being
clear "where besides the definition of personal injury there is room in
the statute for the agency to graft on this additional requirement."191
It would be much more reasonable, Justice O'Connor concluded, to
read the regulation as defining an ambiguous statutory phrase than to
create a superfluous statutory requirement.' 92
C. The Co-existing Standards Created New Confusion About What
Constitutes a 'Personal Injury"
The Court's decision in Schleier is quite difficult to parse without
reading it as a shift away from the Burke Court's interpretation of
"personal injuries," which tests the nature of the discrimination claim
by looking to whether the underlying cause of action evidences a tort-
like conception of injury and remedy. Schleier introduces a require-
ment that employment discrimination may not in itself constitute a
"personal injury" if the compensatory amounts received for violation
of the civil rights statutes are measured by economic loss.
The reasoning of the two cases cannot be reconciled even under
the Schleier majority's view that it was interpreting an independent
requirement. Under the Court's explanation of the two "independ-
ent" requirements, the Court accepted Burke's view of the meaning
"personal injury" as provided by the regulation but then went on to
interpret the statutory requirement that the damages received be "on
account of a personal injury." The problem with the Court's view of
what it did in Schleier is that although the "independent" statutory
requirement may have separate content for noncompensatory recov-
eries, it does not have such content for compensatory recoveries.
As explained earlier, Burke applied the nature of the claim test
by considering whether the discrimination claims asserted constituted
tort-type rights. After Burke, the lower courts addressed the issue of
whether the discrimination recoveries were "personal injury" recov-
eries by considering whether the remedial scheme of the antidis-
crimination statute at issue provided traditional tort or tort type
190. Id. at 2172.
191. Id.
192. Id
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remedies.193 Once it had been determined that the underlying claim
was tort-like in nature, it was assumed that compensatory recoveries
were received "on account" of the personal injury.194
That assumption by the lower courts was grounded in the lan-
guage of the statute. The terms "any damages received.., on account
of personal injuries" could mean either 1) any damages received in
personal injury actions, or 2) any damages received as compensation
for personal injuries. 95 Under the former meaning, all damages re-
ceived in personal injury litigation would be excludable regardless of
whether or not they are compensatory. 96 Under the latter meaning,
amounts received for noncompensatory reasons would not come
within the statutory exclusion. For example, punitive damages may
serve purposes such as punishment or deterrence and thus arguably
are not received "on account" of personal injuries under the second
meaning.' 97 Similarly, pre- or post-judgment interest on recovery
amounts may be received to compensate for the lost time value of
money, not to compensate for personal injuries, and thus arguably are
193. For a discussion of post-Burke lower court decisions, see Heen, supra note 155, at
598-606.
194. Id. See also supra note 172 (discussing Rev. Rul. 93-88).
195. See Mary Jane Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Wrong Rule: The IRS
Demands a Return on All Punitive Damages, 17 CoNN. L. REv. 39, 58-61 (1984).
196. For articulation of such a view based on the "plain meaning" of § 104(a)(2), see
Debra Cohen-Whelan, From Injury to Income: The Taxation of Punitive Damages "on Ac-
count of" United States v. Schleier, 71 No=n DAm L. REv. 913 (1996).
197. Post-Burke analysis of the excludability of punitive damages was mixed. Several
post-Burke lower court decisions considered the question of whether punitive damages are
received "on account" of personal injuries, and reached conflicting conclusions. The post-
Burke cases finding punitive damages to be taxable pointed out that punitive damages are
not received "on account" of the injury, but are designed to punish or discourage certain
behavior. See e.g., Estate of Moore v. Commissioner, 53 F.3d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 1995);
Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894, 896 (5th Cir. 1995); Hawkins v. United States, 30
F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 648 (1994); Reese v. United States,
24 F.3d 228, 235 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 589-90 (4th Cir.
1990), on remand, T.C. Memo. 1993-49 (allocating the proceeds between compensatory
and punitive damages), aff'd per curiam, 60 F.3d 823 (1995). Those cases finding punitive
damages to be excludable from income relied on dictum in Burke and the Court's nature of
the claim analysis. Burke, 504 U.S. at 236 n.6 (stating that, in 1989, "Congress amended
§ 104(a) to allow the exclusion of punitive damages only in cases involving 'physical injury
or physical sickness.'). According to those cases, if a claim involved a "personal injury,"
any type of damages received, including punitive damages, would be excludable. See, e.g.,
Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 625-26 (6th Cir. 1994), af'g 100 T.C. 93 (1993). The
Supreme Court granted review of one of those cases and issued its decision in December
1996. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,567 (D. Kan. 1992)
(holding excludable in punitive damage award and modifying pre-Burke ruling of taxability
on motion for reconsideration in light of Supreme Court's decision in Burke), rev'd, 66
F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996).
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not received "on account" of personal injuries. 198 In contrast, com-
pensatory personal injury recoveries, such as amounts for pain and
suffering, emotional distress or medical costs, would be excludable.
The "on account of" language of the statute thus establishes an in-
dependent restriction only with regard to noncompensatory recov-
eries. Without acknowledging the above ambiguity with respect to the
meaning of the statutory terms "any damages... received on account
of personal injuries," the Schleier majority applied the latter meaning
based on a "plain meaning" analysis.199
By contrast, in O'Gilvie,2o the Court explicitly acknowledged the
statutory ambiguity.201 In an opinion by Justice Breyer,202 the major-
ity noted first that "the phrase 'on account of' does not unambigu-
ously define itself. ' 20 3 The Court then construed the provision as
encompassing only compensatory damages, noting that such an inter-
pretation would be more consistent with the dictionary definition,
with the Court's prior decision in Schleier, and with the statute's his-
tory and the tax-related purpose of excluding compensatory damages
198. Morrison, supra note 195, at 55-57; see Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040,
1047 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that statutory prejudgment interest awarded in a personal
injury action was not received "on account" of personal injury within meaning of
§ 104(a)(2) because it is compensation for the lost time value of money, not compensation
for the personal injury); Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124,130 (1993) (concluding that
interest on wrongful death damages is not excludable under § 104(a)(2)), affd, 25 F.3d
1048 (6th Cir. 1994).
199. See Part II.B. supra
200. 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996). In O'Gilvie, the husband and two children of a woman who
died of toxic shock syndrome paid federal income taxes on a jury award of $10 million
punitive damages (but not on the $1.525 million in actual damages received) in a tort suit
against the maker of the product that caused the decedent's death. They then filed refund
claims. The government refunded the income taxes paid by the children and later filed suit
to recover the refund. The husband's refund suit and the government's suit against the
children were filed in the same District Court, which found for the taxpayers in each case
on the ground that the statutory exclusion from gross income includes punitive damages.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the con-
flict in the circuits on this issue. See supra note 197.
201. See id. at 454 (pointing out two possible linguistic interpretations of the phrase
"on account of" as (1) "a 'but for' connection between 'any' damages and a lawsuit for
personal injuries," or (2) requiring a "stronger causal connection, making the provision
applicable only to those personal injury lawsuit damages that were awarded by reason of,
or because of, the personal injuries," that is, as compensation for the injury rather than to
punish the tortfeasor's conduct).
202. Justice Breyer's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg. Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justices
O'Connor and'Thomas. For a discussion of Justice Breyer's likely impact on the develop-
ment of administrative law, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalis4 Pragma-
tis4 and Empiricist, 8 ADMiN. L. J. AM. U. 747 (1995).
203. 117 S. Ct. at 454.
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that, "making up for a loss, seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking
very loosely, 'return the victim's personal or financial capital.' ' "z 4
Thus, in O'Gilvie, the Court agreed with the Schleier conclusion, but
only after recognizing the linguistic ambiguity of the statute and ap-
plying a contextual analysis, which construed the words in light of the
statute's legislative history and tax-related purpose.205
Significantly, the Schleier Court treated the statutory "on account
of' test as independent of the tort or tort-type rights standard without
explaining how the two can be independent for compensatory recov-
eries. As noted above, recoveries to compensate for a discrimination
claim found to be tort-like in nature were presumed prior to Schleier
to be received "on account of personal injuries." Schleier rejected
that approach, although it remained unclear where the Court would
draw the line between damages received on account of a "personal"
versus an "economic" injury.206
204. Id. at 456 (citing H.R. REP. No. 767, at 9-10 (1918)).
205. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia applied a textual analysis, and argued that
the "ordinary meaning" of the statute would encompass the exclusion of both compensa-
tory and punitive damages. See O'Gilvie 117 S. Ct. at 460 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia criticized the majority for proceeding "too quickly from its erroneous premise of
ambiguity to analysis of the history and policy behind section 104(a)(2)." Id. at 460. In
addition, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's view that the result in O'Gilvie was
foreshadowed by the Court's decision in Schleier. He emphasized that as the "dissent accu-
rately observed [in Schleier], 'the key to the Court's analysis' was the determination that an
ADEA cause of action did not necessarily entail 'personal injury or sickness,' so that the
damages awarded for that cause of action could hardly be awarded 'on account of personal
injuries or sickness."' Id. at 462 (citations omitted).
206. For example, consider two different types of claims, defamation and Title VII sex-
ual harassment claims, where the claims arguably are tort or tort type in nature. For the
defamation claim, if the injury involved damage to professional reputation as opposed to
personal reputation, the question of whether the lost past or future income would be ex-
cludable or not depends upon an interpretation of the term "personal injury." The Schleier
decision suggests that if the injury is "personal," lost pay would be excluded under
§ 104(a)(2) if the requisite link between the injury and the recovery exists. It is unclear,
however, whether the lost pay would be viewed as received "on account" of an injury that
is "personal" as opposed to "economic" in nature. At the very least, the question could
have been raised again after Schieler, despite a string of pre-Burke litigation losses for the
government on this very issue.
Sexual harassment claims raise similar issues. A sexual harassment violation under
Title VII, as amended in 1991, may be remedied by back pay and other equitable relief,
and under certain circumstances, by compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000(e)-5(g), 1981a (a), (b) (Supp. 11 1991); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986). Assuming that a Title VII sexual harassment claim would be held to
be a tort-type claim, lower courts would also be faced with deciding whether any back pay
received is "on account" of "personal injuries." The answer would not be clear under
Schleier. Lower courts would have to determine whether the "personal injury" caused by
sexual harassment should be viewed as being compensated for by amounts received for
back pay as well as for emotional distress, pain and suffering, and medical reimbursements.
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In conclusion, Schleier added an undefined statutory limitation
which precluded the exclusion from gross income of back pay recov-
eries in the employment discrimination setting but did not preclude
the exclusion of recoveries for lost wages or lost earning capacity in
the physical injury setting.207 That limitation conflicted with its earlier
decision in Burke.208 The Court therefore created new uncertainty
about what constituted a "personal injury" within the meaning of sec-
tion 104(a)(2).20 9
III. Implications for Tax Law: Normative Issues
The cases discussed in Part II give cause for concern about the
impact of the Court's evolving approach to statutory interpretation on
Arguably, under Schleier, the personal injury caused by sexual harassment would be con-
fined to personal humiliation or loss of personal dignity, and not the "economic" injury of
lost pay. On the other hand, the loss of pay caused by a sexually hostile working environ-
ment seems very similar to the loss of pay caused by a physical personal injury to a worker.
The humiliation and related dignitary injuries may themselves be viewed as causing the
loss of pay. Under that analysis, back pay should be viewed as being received "on ac-
count" of a "personal injury" within the meaning of § 104(a)(2).
As these examples suggest, the Court gave new undefined content to the term "per-
sonal injuries" in Schleier. Although the Court rejected an explicit distinction between
tangible and intangible harm in Burke and Schleier, it may have adopted an implicit rule
based on the distinction between economic and noneconomic harms, which would have led
to significant allocation and other difficulties in administering the exclusion. See generally
F. Philip Manns, Jr., Down and Out RIFed Employees, Taxes, and Employment Discrimi-
nation Claims After Burke and Schleier, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 103, 123-33 (1995).
207. The "on account of" language would have separate content for back pay only if
the Court refused to view back pay as damages received in compensation for the "personal
injury" of employment discrimination. Such a narrow technical view of the term "dam-
ages" (as limited to compensatory legal damages and not applicable to equitable relief, see
Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009
(1992)) was arguably rejected in Burke, 504 U.S. at 237. For a discussion of the compensa-
tory nature of back pay awards, see Heen, supra note 155, at 572-74.
208. Rather than correct the problems created by its earlier decision in Burke, the
Court grafted another independent requirement onto the problematic "tort or tort type"
standard. As a result, although the Court may have been seeking to resolve some of the
issues generated by Burke's adoption of the "tort or tort type" standard, it resurrected
other issues put to rest in Burke. See supra note 155. For a discussion of some of these
issues, see, e.g., Heen, supra note 155, at 598-606; Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and
Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REv. 327
(1995). See also Arthur W. Andrews, The Taxation of Title VII Victims After the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 46 TAX LAW. 755 (1993); Leandra Lederman Gassenheimer, The Ex-
cludability of Employment Discrimination Awards under Code Section 104(a)(2) after
Burke v. United States and Commissioner v. Schleier, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 315 (1996); Bernard
Wolfman, Current Issues of Federal Tax Policy, 16 U. ARK. Lrrrtn RocK LJ. 543, 547-51
(1994).
209. See generally, Leading Cases, 109 HARv. L. REv. 111, 319-29 (1995) (discussing
the lack of coherent analysis in Schleier).
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the development of tax law. A majority of the Court in Schleier ap-
plied a "plain meaning" approach to section 104(a)(2) when it had
declined to do so only three years before. The opinion was not writ-
ten by a textualist, but by Justice Stevens. When read in light of the
implications of the Court's ruling in Burke, it is difficult to reconcile it
with deference principles or with the Court's earlier interpretation of
the same statutory terms in Burke. However, in O'Gilvie, in an opin-
ion written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice Stevens, the Court
applied a contextual analysis of the "on account of' language in sec-
tion 104(a)(2), reinforcing the conceptual inconsistency between the
two "independent" tests applied in Schleier.
As discussed in Part II, the problems generated by these cases
have their origin in the Court's inconsistent interpretive approaches
and the resulting adoption and then marginalization of the standard
articulated in the Treasury regulation. Perhaps Burke, Schleier, and
O'Gilvie are best viewed as small pieces of a larger and quite difficult
puzzle, in which the Court's struggle to reach a consensus on interpre-
tive issues has interfered with a coherent resolution of the underlying
substantive problem. As suggested by these cases, an inconsistent em-
phasis on the "plain meaning" of the Code could create piecemeal and
incoherent interpretations.
Nevertheless, even if the "plain meaning" approach were more
consistently applied by the Court, problems related to the inherent
limitations of the approach would remain. The Court's application of
the plain meaning approach often restricts its use of potentially illumi-
nating contextual information. Applied in a textualist form, the plain
meaning approach generally precludes consideration of the legislative
history and purpose of the specific tax provision being interpreted, its
prior interpretation, and its relationship to the policy and structure of
the tax code as a whole. Although the Court's debate about its inter-
pretive approach in statutory construction and administrative agency
deference cases has not had as much impact on tax law for the reasons
discussed in Part I, there is evidence that the Court's approach in tax
cases is beginning to reflect its more general reliance on "plain mean-
ing." An increased emphasis on "plain meaning" analysis of the Code
poses an increased risk of misinterpretation in tax cases.
Because both the plain meaning approach and Chevron defer-
ence apply only if the statutory provision is unambiguous, much de-
pends upon the Court's conclusion about ambiguity. The Court's
reluctance to find statutory ambiguity could itself lead to increased
doctrinal incoherence. As Schleier illustrates, the Court sometimes
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fails to recognize or to acknowledge statutory ambiguity. Without an
acknowledgement of ambiguity, the Court may interpret statutory lan-
guage without reference to prior administrative interpretations, creat-
ing a double danger. Without reference to contextual information and
without deference to administrative interpretation, more frequent
plain meaning analysis may lead to an increase in incoherent and un-
predictable results, making effective tax administration more difficult.
A more consistent and complete immersion in the history and
purpose of section 104(a)(2) might have led to a more coherent inter-
pretive result,210 but would it have been worth the effort? Would it
lead to a better decision-making approach over the long term? Is Pro-
fessor Schauer correct in suggesting that the plain meaning approach
represents better use of judicial resources? 211 Why should the Court
engage in the more time-consuming task of becoming expert in the
history and policy of the Code in general and the specific provision
being interpreted in particular if the plain meaning approach arguably
offers a more efficient and normatively beneficial decision-making
procedure?
In raising these types of questions, and suggesting that they be
answered in favor of the plain meaning approach, Professor Schauer
focuses quite specifically on the function of plain meaning as a deci-
sion-making procedure independent of "any conception of the pri-
macy of one governmental body rather than another as a matter of
political theory. '212 Although this decision-making function, and the
210. Professor Schauer argues that one way of evaluating the "plain meaning" ap-
proach as compared to a more contextual form of decision-making is to compare the fre-
quency of interpretive "mistakes" over a large number of cases. See Schauer, Practice and
Problems, supra note 3, at 740-41. Whether a more far-ranging contextual analysis of
§ 104(a)(2) by the Court would have resulted in a more coherent result has been debated.
Compare Geier, Textualism, supra note 2, at 472 (concluding that consideration of the
structure and policy of the Code would not have led to a better decision in this context);
with Heen, supra note 155, at 554-55 (concluding that such consideration would have led to
a better result). In undertaking an analysis of the frequency of the Court's mistakes, it is
questionable whether commentators would consistently agree on whether a "mistake" has
been made, or even if they so agreed, whether they would reach the same conclusion about
the nature of the Court's "mistake."
211. According to Professor Schauer, that approach may have particular advantages in
tax cases:
My instinct is that these Justices with these clerks with this amount of time will
make less of a hash of tax law in the long run by trying to rely on plain meaning
than by trying to divine and apply the deepest purposes and equities of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. And even if I am wrong about this, it would not surprise me
if the Justices themselves thought this.
Schauer, Coordinating Function, supra note 12, at 254 n.85.
212. Schauer, Practice and Problems, supra note 3, at 731.
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institutional stability it may promote, could plausibly explain the in-
creased use of plain meaning analysis, it would not justify its use in the
tax context. Whether such a decision-making procedure should be
used by the Court in interpreting the Code requires consideration of
the roles played by the various governmental branches in the develop-
ment of tax law.213
The risk of incoherent results has a direct effect on efforts to ad-
minister the tax laws in a uniform and consistent way. How can such
mistakes or inconsistencies be minimized in interpretation of the tax
laws? As mentioned above, there are a range of possibilities. The
Court could immerse itself in the details and complexities of the Code,
utilizing a wide range of sources of meaning, and reach its best answer
to interpretive questions given the statutory language, purpose, his-
tory and context. Alternatively, the Court could defer to reasonable
interpretations of the Code by Treasury, to the extent that Congress
has delegated the agency such responsibility. Finally, as suggested by
Professor Schauer's analysis, the Court could use a suboptimal "sec-
ond best" plain meaning approach to interpretation as a resource-sav-
ing mechanism and let Congress fix its mistakes. If those were the
choices, the Court should opt for the first or second approach rather
than the third. Either would be preferable to what Professor Schauer
identifies as the resource-conserving plain meaning approach. My
own preference would be for the Court to apply a contextually in-
formed interpretation of the Code, which would permit consideration
of Treasury's views, among other factors, and to apply a heightened
deference standard only where Congress has explicitly delegated legis-
lative-type authority to Treasury.214
The following sections discuss normative issues raised by reliance
on the plain meaning approach, including an evaluation of the costs of
relying on legislative correction and the benefits of protecting the
public from captured administrative agencies. I conclude that there
are legitimate reasons in the tax context to reject the plain meaning
approach as a resource-saving decision-making procedure.
213. Professor Schauer acknowledges that the determination of when the plain mean-
ing approach is desirable as a form of decisionmaking is "necessarily domain-contextual,"
and states that "the degree to which comparatively acontextual interpretive approaches in
the service of some diminution of agency power would be desirable will vary as well." Id.
at 736-37.
214. For a persuasive discussion of these issues, see Coverdale, supra note 74, at 67-79,
88-89.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
PLAIN MEANING AND THE TAX CODE
A. Legislative Correction
Increased reliance on legislative correction raises issues of legisla-
tive resource allocation and of comity. It is not easy to get Congress
to fix interpretive mistakes of reviewing courts-at least not readily
enough to ameliorate the tax administration burdens resulting from
suboptimal and possibly inconsistent decisions. Legislative correction
becomes even more difficult if the legislative fix were to result in reve-
nue losses rather than revenue gains.215 Although it may not be as
difficult for Congress to fix courts' tax interpretation mistakes216 as it
may be in other areas of the law21 7 in which legislative activity occurs
less frequently, the resource allocation issues posed by such reliance
on legislative correction still raise legitimate concerns.21 8 On the
whole, comity among the branches of government will be better
served if courts try to make sense of the statutory provision in light of
its context, recognizing that congressional correction may be delayed
or may not occur at all if congressional action cannot be galvanized.2 19
Consider for example the seven-year period prior to the adoption
by Congress of amendments to section 104(a)(2) in 1996. Congress
first considered a legislative answer to the question of the excludabil-
ity of employment discrimination recoveries when it adopted amend-
ments to the Code in 1989.220 Although the House passed a bill that
would have restricted the exclusion to physical injuries,221 there was
215. See Geier, Purpose, supra note 2, at 511 n.62. But cf. Zelinsky, supra note 2, at
729 ("The need for legislative repair is classically perceived when the literal application of
the Code leads to a pro-taxpayer result that is unacceptable to Treasury officials, Con-
gress's tax-writers, and the professionals who advise them.").
216. See Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 728-29 (arguing that the Code is highly correctable
by legislation).
217. For a discussion of the reasons why legislative correction of the Court's interpreta-
tion of a specific provision enacted as part of a larger piece of legislation may be difficult to
achieve, see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
218. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response, 93 McH. L. REv. 1, 20-32, 38 (1994) (discussing
the opportunity costs and other resource issues involved in legislative correction).
219. See id at 87-89. See also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE LJ. 331 (1991); Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich,
When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. Rnv. 729 (1991); John Copeland Nagle,
Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. Rv. 1267, 1280-90 (1996).
220. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106
(1989) [hereinafter OBRA '89].
221. H.R 3299, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 § 11641 (1989). The House Report ob-
served that courts have interpreted the § 104(a)(2) exclusion "broadly in some cases to
cover awards for personal injury that do not relate to a physical injury or sickness. For
example, some courts have held that the exclusion applies to damages in cases involving
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no corresponding Senate provision and the conference committee did
not adopt the House proposal.-2 Without explanation of its action,
the conference committee instead adopted an entirely different
amendment limiting the exclusion for certain punitive damages re-
ceived in cases involving nonphysical injuries.= Three years and
many lower court decisions later,2 4 the Supreme Court interpreted
the unamended version of the statute in Burke. Litigation over the
application of the statute to nonphysical injuries continued after
Burke and Schleier. In 1995, after Schleier, the House passed an
amendment to section 104(a)(2) similar to its 1989 provision.2 5 This
time, the conference committee adopted the House amendment, as
modified by the Senate.226 President Clinton vetoed the provision as
part of a massive omnibus budget reconciliation bill. 7 In 1996, the
House passed another provision similar to its 1989 proposal.228 The
Senate bill contained no parallel provision, although it did contain a
employment discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no physical injury or
sickness." H.R. Rep. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1354-55, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25.
222. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3018.
223. The 1989 Act inserted at the end of § 104(a)(2) the sentence "[p]aragraph (2) shall
not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury
or physical sickness." OBRA '89, supra note 220, § 7641(a), 103 Stat. at 2379 (amending
Code § 104(a)(2) (1988)).
The OBRA amendment did not apply to the punitive damage award in O'Gilvie. The
taxpayers argued in O'Gilvie, however, that in 1989 Congress must have assumed that pu-
nitive damages received for physical injuries would remain excludable. The Court sug-
gested that the OBRA language may merely have reflected an awareness that the law was
unclear for both physical and nonphysical injuries, and that Congress "wanted to clarify the
matter in respect to nonphysical injuries, but it wanted to leave the law where it found it in
respect to physical injuries." 117 S. Ct. at 457. In any event, the Court refused to rely on
the views of a later Congress in interpreting an earlier statute. See id. at 458.
224. See Heen, supra note 155, at 579-90 (collecting cases).
225. See H.R. 2491, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13611 (1995). See H.R. Rep. No. 280, Vol.
II, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 319 (Oct. 17, 1995) (citing Schleier and explaining that the IRS
had suspended existing guidance of the tax treatment of damages received for employment
discrimination other than age discrimination).
226. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 350,104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1452 (Nov. 16,1995) (explain-
ing that the Senate provision in section 12811 of the Senate bill was the same as section
13611 of the House bill, except that in some cases the exclusion from gross income would
apply to punitive damages received in a wrongful death action so long as state law had
already provided that only punitive damages may be awarded in a wrongful death action).
227. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (vetoed on Feb.
29, 1996).
228. See H.R. 3448, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 1605 (1996); H.R. Rep. 586, 104th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 43 (May 20, 1996) (including in income all punitive damages and damage recov-
eries for nonphysical injuries).
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provision relating to punitive damages. 229 The conference committee
adopted the House provision as part of a revenue offset for the Small
Business Protection Act,230 which President Clinton signed into
law.231 Thus, seven years after it was first proposed, the amendment
became law. The exclusion from gross income under Code section
104(a)(2) now applies to damages "other than punitive damages" re-
ceived "on account of personal physical injuries or physical
sickness."232
Although in this example Congress took action, much time and
many legislative resources were expended in the process. Too much
reliance on legislative correction in the tax area would waste legisla-
tive resources that could be expended in other ways. Furthermore,
the adoption of the amendment to section 104(a)(2) depended upon
the amendment's status as a revenue offset for other politically popu-
lar tax breaks in a Presidential election year. Congressional action
thus depended upon the convergence of a number of factors, including
the viability of much larger pieces of legislation to which the amend-
ment was attached.
229. See § 1603 of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3448, 142 Cong. Rec. S7366, S7385
(daily ed. July 8, 1996) (providing that the exclusion from gross income does not apply to
any punitive damages received on account of personal injury whether or not related to a
physical injury, except for certain damages awarded in a wrongful death action).
230. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 737, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. 88-89 (Aug. 1, 1996).
231. Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1838.
232. As amended, § 104(a) provides in relevant part as follows:
gross income does not include-,
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether
by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on ac-
count of personal physical injuries or physical sickness ....
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as a physi-
cal injury or physical sickness. The preceding sentence shall not apply to an
amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical
care ... attributable to emotional distress.
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2)(1996).
I have argued elsewhere that restricting "personal injuries" to physical injuries would
not be the correct fix. See Heen, supra note 155, at 606-16. Professor Kahn, in contrast,
has argued in favor of limiting the exclusion to physical injuries. See Douglas A. Kahn,
Taxation of Damages after Schleier-Where Are We and Where Do We Go From Here?, 15
QLR 305, 342 (1995) (concluding that the 1996 statutory amendments "should cure most of
the remaining ills in the treatment of damages"); Kahn, supra note 208, at 356-58.
Although I disagree with Professor Kahn's view that the policy justification for excluding
damages is "weaker when the injury is exclusively nonphysical than when physical injury is
involved," id at 357, I agree that a bright-line standard may be easier to administer than
the standards adopted by the Court in Schieler and Burke.
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B. Agency Capture
Professor Schauer has also argued that the plain meaning ap-
proach may play an important corrective role in the context of "some-
times-captured" agencies, while acknowledging that its usefulness for
that purpose will vary depending upon the context.P 3 Although there
may be a need for corrective action if Chevron deference is based on
an overly optimistic view of the democratic, pluralistic role played by
executive agencies, Treasury may be relatively less prone than other
administrative agenicies to capture by interest groups. 4 As Professor
Zelinsky argues, tax administrators are subject to the multiple, some-
times offsetting pressures of a broad range of tax constituencies, giv-
ing Treasury and the IRS a greater ability to pursue their regulatory
agenda than policymakers dependent for political support on a more
narrow or homogeneous range of interest groups.P 5 Unlike the envi-
ronmental context, for example, in which the pro-development and
anti-development interests compete against each other for govern-
mental regulatory policy, 36 the tax arena is marked by many compet-
ing interests, most with the agenda of lessening their own separate
individual or interest group tax burdens. In that arena, the organized
interest groups seek tax benefits for themselves, but rarely oppose
benefits for each other.237 Although Treasury is not immune from in-
terest group pressures, it has remained somewhat insulated from the
short-term political pressures and constituent needs faced by members
of Congress.
If the intuition is correct that the Treasury Department is rela-
tively less subject to capture by regulated interests, and if the plain
233. See supra notes 36 & 213.
234. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest A Study of the Leg-
islative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1, 114-115
(1990); see also JoiHN F. WrrrE, THE Pouncs AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL IN-
COME TAX 382-84 (1985) (suggesting that income tax policymaking be reformed by shifting
decisions from the legislative to the executive branch, as was done for tariff changes in the
1930's).
235. See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A
Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1192-94
(1993); see also Ferguson et al., supra note 73, at 821-22.
236. See generally, Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpreta-
tion Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than Judicial
Literalism, 53 WASH. & Lnn L. REv. 1231, 1233 (1996) (discussing the "frequent conflict in
environmental statutes between protecting the public health and limiting the cost of
regulation").
237. Shaviro, supra note 234, at 55-56 n.254 (noting a "few cases" in which interest
groups compete, "as in the longstanding battles between stock and mutual insurance com-
panies or between taxable and tax exempt businesses").
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meaning approach provides a check on agency interpretation by cap-
tured administrative agencies, then there may be less need for it in the
tax context than in some other areas. Greater danger in the tax con-
text may be posed by the possibility that the government would over-
reach in its efforts to raise revenue than in its capture by particular
interest groups.
If government overreaching poses a danger, heightened defer-
ence to agency interpretation by the courts may lead to overenforce-
ment of the tax laws rather than to underenforcement. This possibility
suggests the need for alternative correctives, such as greater scrutiny
of the agency's interpretation by the courts or a less expansive view of
delegation to Treasury by Congress. As pointed out by Professor
Shaviro in the context of evaluating various possible reforms of the
tax legislative process, an executive agency such as Treasury "would
not necessarily be good at making political decisions, such as what
types of income should be tax-favored.' ' 238 Broader delegation to
Treasury "would require a prior political consensus to bar such deci-
sions and restrict the agency's power over implementation."'' 9 He has
concluded that tax reform in 1986 "probably stretched the outer limits
of any such consensus." 240 As a political matter, therefore, Congress
may prefer more narrow specification of the particular contexts in
which it delegates legislative-type authority to Treasury.
The above assumptions and intuitions about legislative correction
and agency capture need further exploration. My purpose here is
merely to raise them as the type of issues that would need investiga-
tion before embracing the plain meaning approach as a decision-mak-
ing procedure in tax cases. At bottom, the resolution of the normative
inquiry may depend upon a cost/benefit analysis, taking into account
our constitutional values and resource allocation issues as well assess-
ing over a longer period of time the effect of the Court's approach on
the development of tax law.
Conclusion
As the above discussion demonstrates, the Supreme Court's
evolving approach to statutory interpretation may adversely affect the
development of tax law in several ways. Although the Court has been
applying the relatively acontextual "plain meaning" analysis in an in-
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creasing number of cases, it does not consistently apply any one ap-
proach to statutory interpretation. As suggested by Burke, Schleier,
and O'Gilvie, the Court's inconsistent approach to statutory interpre-
tation creates incoherence in the development of tax law.
Even if the Court were to apply the "plain meaning" approach
more consistently, problems would remain because of the inherent
difficulty of determining textual meanings. Much rides on the Court's
initial determination of ambiguity or "plain meaning" because of its
deference doctrine, under which the Court defers to reasonable ad-
ministrative agency interpretation when there are statutory gaps or
ambiguities. Inconsistencies in the approach to the ambiguity of statu-
tory language or the applicable deference standard can lead to an-
other form of doctrinal incoherence, in which the Court sometimes
interprets a statute based on its "plain meaning" and sometimes de-
fers to administrative interpretation.
Recent Supreme Court tax decisions suggest that there is cause
for concern about the effect of the Court's approach to statutory inter-
pretation on the development of tax law. More evidence over a
longer period of time would be needed to come to more firm conclu-
sions about such effects. If the early signals represent a pattern that
continues, the normative implications must be carefully considered in
light of the roles played by the various governmental branches in the
development of tax law.
The resolution of the normative inquiry may depend upon a cost/
benefit analysis, taking into account constitutional values and the re-
source allocation issues discussed above. Based upon a preliminary
assessment of those issues, including the resource allocation issues
raised by reliance on legislative correction and the limited potential
for regulatory capture in this context, I conclude that the increased
danger of doctrinal incoherence posed by "plain meaning" is not
worth the "benefit" of less engagement by the Court (and conse-
quently lessened contentiousness) in tax cases.
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